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Abstract 
Since 1980s, local government debt has occurred successively and developed rapidly. 
The financial system reform in 1994 and the great bailout plan in 2008 have led heavy 
burden on local governments and therefore generated a lot of local government debts. 
 
In recent years, the annual growth rate of government debts is over 20%, greatly 
exceeding the rate of economic growth. Besides, the total amount of local government 
debts is over 1.5 times as annual revenue, and the proportion of local debts is much 
higher than other countries. The rapid growth of local debts may lead local governments 
unable to repay. Especially, the borrowing through non-formal channels implies high 
risk, so the unpayable debt could eventually lead to economic or political crisis. This 
phenomenon has aroused vigilance of policy makers and scholars. 
 
The academia devotes energy on sovereign debts; however the issue of local debts has 
not attracted enough attention. In Chinese academia, the research on local debts has just 
begun; and due to the unclear market and the lack of accurate data, there is almost no 
quantitative analysis. In this dissertation, the objective is to extend current methods to 
China's local governments, which has not been well addressed so far. 
 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial swap agreement. It is used to avoid potential 
credit risks by purchasing a contract similar to insurance. CDS quote (price) is an 
important signal to show the risk of the underlying asset(s).  
 
In order to measure local government's risk, this dissertation proposes the concept of 
local government CDS. Similar to sovereign CDS and corporate CDS, it is a credit swap 
contract, representing a type of measure of risk of local government debt. Through 
structured model combined with Merton and Black-Cox models, Shanghai's CDS is 
simulated. 
 
After that, by using intensity models, the default probabilities have also been estimated. 
The result shows the risk of Shanghai's bond is higher than of central government's, and 
their trends are not fully consistent. Province comparison is also applied to illustrate the 
effect of fiscal situation. 
 
Shadow banking is another important feature of current market. It is the entirety of 
unregulated or weak regulated financial intermediaries. Shadow banking has already 
become a major bridge for the subprime borrowers and market surplus funds, including 
the financing platforms of local governments. It can play an active role of financial 
innovation and credit creation. Nevertheless, because the shadowed activities are less 
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regulated and supervised (so it is called "shadow"), higher interest rates are generally 
required and potential risk is high. 
 
There is rare quantitative research on the issue of shadow banking and default 
probability, maybe because of its elusiveness. This dissertation also has only done some 
fundamental studies about it, but has analyzed the academic research situation 
exhaustively and suggested developing directions. The precise analysis should be 
developed in future. 
 
Last, the topic of China's local government debt is huge and very critical. Currently, 
most risk is diving, but there is already unstable tendency for some provinces. It can be 
predicted that some small default would occur in the near future. 
 
Key words: local government debt; financial risk; CDS; shadow banking 
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1 Introduction 
Financial risk of local governments is centrally reflected as the debt risk. Since Chinese 
economic reform, especially after 2008, most of China's local governments have 
borrowed a large amount of debt. Due to the long-term lack of supervision, the size and 
structure of debt of some local governments have exceeded their solvency levels, so as 
to cause various negative phenomena, which have aroused great attention of policy 
makers and economists. 
1.1 Background 
China's local government debt (often abbreviated as local debt), which local 
governments are responsible to repay, had initially appeared in 1979. Since 1980s, the 
behavior, government borrowing, has occurred successively and developed gradually. 
 
Because the old fiscal system had some serious defects, China has carried out the fiscal 
system reform in 1994, and it has become a turning point. The most important point of 
the reform is "tax sharing system". In this system, the levy method and allocation of tax 
was fully changed. As a result, the central fiscal situation has been significantly 
improved, but the local governments have met more financial difficulties since then. 
 
After the global financial crisis in 2008, China, in order to stimulate the economy, has 
taken a proactive fiscal policy and loose monetary policy. As a far-reaching policy 
decision, the Chinese government carried out a great bailout plan. It is a set of programs, 
with the core content of government investment of four trillion yuan. 70% of the 
investment should be paid by local governments, almost equal to their total income. 
Consequently, the local government debt has soared since then. 
 
In China, there are different levels of governments: central government (中央 ), 
provinces (省, 直辖市, 自治区), cities (市), wards and counties (区县), town (乡镇) ... 
However, in current political system, a government in higher level is responsible for 
matters and events of subordinate governments. For this reason, in this dissertation, 
provincial governments and all the lower levels are regarded as a whole (provincial 
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level), and collectively called "local government", unless otherwise stated. 
 
That a sovereign government bears some debt is common sense and not surprising at all. 
Putting external debt aside, the debt borrowed from the domestic market is not a 
worrying problem, and not particularly concerned, either. It is because the whole 
domestic market itself is controlled by the central government, at least by a strong 
government. 
 
But how about local governments? At least, the market is not fully controlled by a local 
government. Local governments cannot take some methods to ease the debt burden, 
either (for instance, to print money). Therefore, the debt problem of local governments 
has become a new topic in recent years, especially in China. 
 
Local governments have to continuously construct the urban infrastructure, to spend on 
social security system, and many other projects; but the revenue from traditional 
channels, including bank loans, is strictly limited. To compensate for the lack of local 
financial resources, there are two major methods: issuing government bonds and 
borrowing though other channels. These have also aggravated the burden on local 
governments. Detailed contents will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Due to the audit result of national local government debts, at the end of 20101, debts 
that need to be repaid by financial funds of local governments have reached up to 6.71 
trillion yuan; and which have increased up to 10.89 trillion yuan by June, 20132. The 
local debt has grown over 60% within 2 years and half (faster than GDP growth rate and 
revenue growth rate), astoundingly rapid. 
 
As the local governments borrow debts wantonly through neither supervised nor 
regulated systems, it eventually caused the huge size of local debt, which is much 
higher than the financial capacity of local governments. This leads local governments 
facing huge debt risk, and there emerged undesirable phenomena such as financial 
difficulties, deficit expanding and debt refinancing. 
                                                              
1 Data source: PRC Audit Notice No. 35 of 2011: National government debt audit results 
2 Data source: PRC Audit Notice No. 32 of 2013: National government debt audit results 
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The issue of government debt has begun to attract attention since the Latin American 
sovereign debt crisis in 1980s. Specially, the crises in 1997 and from 2008 have 
accelerated the research tendency. 
 
If the rapid growth of local debt is indulged, it is very likely to lead local governments 
unable to repay their debt due to changes in policy or market. Once the crisis broke out, 
the treatment method will be another more serious problem: Shift, conversion, extension 
or direct repudiation: regardless of the treatment, at this step, bad influences will be 
certainly brought. The worst result might be political instability. Hence, not only 
scholars, but also policy makers, are paying great attention on the problem. 
1.2 Research Approach 
In this dissertation, the main purpose is to find a method of measuring local 
government's debt risk, and try to calculate the risk actually. Meanwhile, consider the 
effect of other factors as far as possible. 
 
A common method of such research is to extend previous researches to this field. 
However, there are practical difficulties: One is the research on this field started very 
late, and not deep; another one is because of the lack of data, there is very little 
quantitative analysis. Therefore, the proper method is to be discovered. 
 
To achieve the objective, the research approach is: 
1. Have an overview of the current situation of China's local debt and related 
phenomena. In order to understand better, compare it with foreign countries. 
2. Review related literatures to catch previous research mentalities and find the trace of 
valuable methods. In this part, a handy tool, credit default swap (CDS), is found. 
3. Propose a new concept: suppose the CDS can be applied onto local government 
bonds. Along this line, establish a model to estimate the CDS data of a local 
government. 
4. Apply the data to calculate the default risk, and discuss the suitability of models. 
5. Considering the effect of other factors, discuss future situation and draw 
conclusions. 
1 Introduction 
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1.3 Contributions of the Dissertation 
Due to the deficiency of reliable data resource, it was quite difficult to deal with local 
debt directly. Therefore, Chinese scholars tended to discuss the regulatory, management 
and risk warning theoretically, while foreign scholars were mainly targeting at sovereign 
debt, in country level. This dissertation has extended previous researches to provincial 
level, and calculated quantitatively. 
 
In past several years, many Chinese scholars have discussed different aspect of shadow 
banking system, such as financial innovation, credit creation, system stability and 
regulatory. This dissertation has analyzed the citation network of hundreds of Chinese 
literatures, and has drawn a literature tree. 
 
Besides, in this dissertation, a new concept that CDS of local government bonds is 
proposed, by which the quantitative analysis of risk is applied to local debt. Then, it has 
actually estimated and applied CDS data. 
1.4 Structure and Outline 
This dissertation mainly consists of the current situation, literature review and model 
parts. Specifically: 
 
The first chapter is the introduction. This chapter shows a brief description of the 
background, problem and significance of the issue of local government debt. 
 
The second chapter is the current situation of China's government debt. Not only China 
itself, but also several other countries are mentioned and compared together. It shows 
China's current situation is not terrible, but some characteristics should be noticed. 
 
The third chapter is literature review. There are mainly three different aspects: general 
research of government debts (central, i.e. sovereign, and local); the characteristic and 
role of CDS; and the issue emerged in recent years, shadow banking. 
 
The forth chapter is description about Shanghai's CDS. It is too large an issue for 
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analyzing all the provincial governments, so Shanghai is selected as a typical case. Data 
of "local CDS" is simulated in this chapter. 
 
The fifth chapter is to use the CDS data to simulate Shanghai's risk. The effect of other 
factors (e.g. shadow banking system) will also be adopted here. 
 
The rest part is future prospects and conclusions. 
 
The structure tree of this dissertation is: 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 Dissertation Structure 
 
Introduction
Overview
Model 
Application 
Literature 
Review
Model 
Establishment
Future 
Discussion 
Conclusion
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2 Current Situation of China's Government Debt 
2.1 Bond, Financing Platform and Debt Categories 
In Chapter 1, it is mentioned that in order to deal with the fiscal gap, there are two main 
methods: to issue local bonds and to borrow through other channels. 
 
Due to Budget Law of People's Republic of China (effective as of January 1, 1995), 
local governments are not allowed to issue local government bonds, except as otherwise 
provided by law or the State Council3. Therefore, there were only central bonds for a 
long time until 2008. 
 
From 2009, in order to meet financing needs, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has 
permitted local governments to issue local bonds, of which the form and quantity are 
restricted and the issuance must be made by the MOF as an agent. So, in China, local 
bonds are examined and guaranteed to a certain extent by central government. 
 
As an experiment, several provinces and cities with better financial status are permitted 
issuing their own bonds with some restrict. Concretely, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong 
and Shenzhen started to issue their individual bonds from 2011, and Jiangsu and 
Shandong started from 2013 (MOF, 2011, 2013). These six governments do not attend 
the general issuance. Because of their good credit, the yields are lower than that of 
general bonds. For more information about such governments, see Appendix A. 
 
However, the total amount of this method, government bonds, is only about 5% of total 
local revenue. Therefore, in order to borrow more money smoothly and for earmark, the 
local governments are tending to borrow money by the other method. 
 
This method is to establish some companies and institutions, and to operate them to 
borrow money from society and invest on projects. These companies and institutions are 
called "financing platforms". For example, Hangzhou Metro Group Company Limited 
                                                              
3 Budget Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 28. 
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(杭州市地铁集团有限责任公司) is a financing platform established by Hangzhou city, 
which mainly engaged in rail transportation construction, operation and management. 
Due to a material released by China Banking Regulatory Commission, there are over 
10,000 such platforms by 2012 (CBRC, 2012). 
 
However, the bank loans are still banned for financing platforms because of their weak 
solvency. The only way is to borrow money from society. To finance by financial 
institutions, by trust companies, to build projects by private enterprises and redeem later 
(build-transfer, BT), or to borrow money from non-bank institutions, and so on. 
 
All these methods are called "shadowed", because the transactions are generally done 
without being supervised. For this reason, the transactions basically do not meet the 
official provisos, such as credit examination or return rate. 
 
Both governments and financing platforms borrow debt, so it is necessary to clarify the 
research object before discussing the situation. The definition of concept "local 
government debt" is provided in audit reports. 
 
Chinese central government has paid great attention to the problem of local debt, and 
has investigated the debt situation from 2011; specifically, it decided to get accurate 
data and ordered all 30 provinces (except Tibet) to audit their debts seriously. As a result, 
National Audit Office has released two audit reports in 2011 and 2013, which described 
the whole circumstance of local debt at the end of 2010 and June 2013 (and another 
report describing the circumstance of 36 province/city governments at the end of 2012). 
Besides, all 30 provinces (except Tibet) have also released their audit reports in Jan. 
2014. 
 
In the audit reports, the borrowers are divided into provincial level, municipal level, 
county level and township level. The total debts are divided into three main categories:  
1) Government debt: governments have responsibility to repay the debt by financial 
funds. 
2) Guarantee obligation: Mainly made by financing platforms. This type of debts is 
repaid by non-financial funds. Guarantees are provided by government. The debts 
2 Current Situation of China's Government Debt 
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will be compensated by departmental budgets or special fees if there are any risks. 
3) Responsibility of debt relief: Mainly made by financing platforms for the public 
welfare projects, such as public schools, public hospitals. The government does not 
assume responsibility for the debt service obligations in the law. But if there are 
risks, the government may bear some responsibility for relief. 
 
Category 2) and 3) are also collectively called contingent liabilities. These three types 
are not simply addable. In this dissertation, the research object is only category 1. 
 
From the aspect of creditors, there are 11 categories in total. The top five occupying the 
largest share are: Bank loans, Build and Transfer (BT), Bond issuance, Trust financing, 
and other unit and individual borrowings. 
2.2 Current Situation of Local Government debt 
In this section, specific data of total local debt in 2012-2013 will be shown, with some 
fundamental analysis. 
 
Due to the nationwide audit report, as of the end of June 2013, China's governments at 
all levels bear the responsibility to repay the debt (type 1) of 20.70 trillion yuan; the 
amount of local debt is one trillion larger than the central debt. By December 2012, the 
total amount is about 19 trillion yuan, and the local debt is almost equal to central debt. 
Table 2.1 Debt Scale of China's Governments (billion yuan)4 
Year Gov. Level Gov. Debt 
Contingent Liabilities 
Guarantee 
obligation 
Responsibility 
of debt relief 
2012.12 
Central 9,437.67 283.57 2,162.12 
Local 9,628.19 2,487.12 3,770.52 
Total 19,065.86 2,770.70 5,932.63 
2013.6 
Central 9,812.95 260.07 2,311.08 
Local 10,885.92 2,665.58 4,339.37 
                                                              
4 Data source: PRC Audit Notice No. 32 of 2013 
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Total 20,698.87 2,925.65 6,650.46 
 
In order to clarify the relative size of government debt, calculate ratio of the debt 
amount to GDP and revenue (Table 2.2), and compare them with international standard 
level. 
Table 2.2 GDP and Fiscal Revenue (billion yuan)5 
 2012.12 2013.12 
GDP 51,947.01 56,884.52 
Revenue 
Central 5,617.52 6,017.38 
Local 6,107.83 6,896.91 
Total 11,725.35 12,914.29 
 
In 2012, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 36.69% (central 18.16%, local 18.53%), which is 
lower than the prudential limit of 60% for developed countries, or 40% for developing 
and emerging economies (Anis and Iyanatul, 2010). If take contingent liabilities into 
account, considering the government burden rate, the amended debt-to-GDP would be 
39.43%, still lower than the international standard. 
 
However, in 2012, the debt-to-revenue ratio (debt ratio) of central government was 
168.0%, and of local governments was 157.6%, much higher than the internationally 
recognized warning line of 100%. This is because the revenue level of China is low. 
 
Also, analyze the composition of government debts for China (Table 2.3, Fig. 2.1). It 
can be found that the proportion of local debt is about 53%, in a relatively high level. 
This will be discussed in next section. 
 
In addition, the municipal and county debt account for the largest proportion of local 
debt, because they bear more responsibility for public services. As mentioned before, 
the local government is regarded as a whole. 
 
                                                              
5 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Communiqué on National Economic and Social Development, 
2012 & 2013 
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Table 2.3 Scale of Government Debt of All Levels, 2013.6 (billion yuan) 
Level Gov. Debt 
Guarantee 
obligation 
Responsibility 
of debt relief 
Central 9812.95 260.07 2311.08 
Province 1778.08 1562.76 1853.13 
City 4843.46 742.41 1704.37 
County 3957.36 348.80 735.75 
Town 307.01 11.60 46.12 
Total 20,698.87 2,925.65 6,650.46 
 
Fig. 2.1 Proportion of Government Debt of All Levels, 2013.6 
 
2.3 Compare with Other Countries 
A common approach to observe the debt level is comparing it with "industry average" 
(international standard level) and "other competitors" (other countries). Therefore, in 
this section, six countries are selected for comparison: the United States, Japan, Korea, 
United Kingdom, France and Germany. 
 
Obtain their debt data from OECD database, and calculate their debt-to-GDP ratio and 
2 Current Situation of China's Government Debt 
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the proportion of local debt (Table 2.4, Table 2.5). 
 
Table 2.4 General Government Gross Financial Liabilities as a Percentage of GDP (%)6 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
U.S. 60.93 62.12 71.40 85.03 94.17 98.76 102.12 104.09 
Japan 172.15 167.05 174.10 194.05 199.97 210.63 218.80 227.15 
Korea 28.52 28.72 30.40 33.46 34.58 36.17 35.50 35.60 
U.K. 46.04 47.17 57.43 72.45 82.19 99.01 102.37 106.99 
France 71.21 72.96 79.27 90.82 95.18 99.26 109.33 113.04 
Germany 69.83 65.57 69.74 77.44 87.06 85.84 88.26 86.06 
Table 2.5 Percentage of Local Debt of Major Developed Countries (%)6 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
U.S. 40.85 42.53 43.72 37.00 34.93 
Japan 6.01 1.50 0.00 5.42 - 
Korea 0.00 0.00 4.53 2.71 7.64 
U.K. 6.21 9.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 
France 26.79 28.57 32.63 32.58 29.17 
Germany 40.95 39.68 43.29 42.92 49.00 
" - " means missing data. 
Significantly, the proportions of government debts of these countries have increased 
after the 2008 crisis, except Korea, relatively stable.  
 
From Table 2.5, it is known that for the six countries, the proportions of local debt are 
almost stable and remained at origin level even after the financial crisis. 
 
Compare China's debt-to-GDP ratio to these six countries, it is found that (take 2012 as 
an example) the ratio of China (36.69%) is much lower than of others. However, the 
                                                              
6 Data source: OECD website,  
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/government-debt_gov-debt-table-en 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/total-central-government-debt_20758294-table1 
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proportion of local debt is found to be greater than other countries (Fig. 2.2): 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 Debt-to-GDP Ratio and Proportion of Local Debt7 
As a conclusion of above comparative analysis, it can be said that the financial leverage 
of China is at a healthy degree, and is safer than most of other developed countries. 
However, because the revenue level is low, the financing capacity is not optimistic, and 
hence governments need to prepare for probable danger (Wei et al, 2012). In addition, 
the proportion of local debt is large. Considering the weaker status of local governments, 
it means the risk is also caution needed. 
 
                                                              
7 Debt-to-GDP rate: Japan's histogram is truncated. 
Proportion of local debt: use 2012 data for China, 2009 data for Japan, and 2010 data for others. 
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3 Literature Review 
After the overview of the current situation, it is nature to consider how to analyze risk 
on microscopic scale, i.e. at provincial level. Generally, the method is to extend 
previous researches and adopt widely used analytical tools to this field. Hence to look 
for previous studies is quite necessary. For this purpose, in this chapter, international 
researches on related issues are reviewed. 
3.1 Government Debt and China's Local Debt 
3.1.1 Origin of Researches 
The history of research about government debt can be traced even to 1910s. In 1914, 
Gustav Seidler has published "Fifty Years of Government Debt 1862-1912", creating a 
precedent for research in this area. In local debt field, the research also started early. 
Allen, H. K. and Gilbert James H. have published "Local Government Debt 
Administration" respectively in 1940. 
 
After WWII, especially from 1970s, the research about government debt gradually 
increased. In the area of local debt, new directions appeared, such as state administrative 
supervision (Hecrist, 1972), debt administration (Bell, 1976), debt ceilings and 
expenditure limits (Gelfand, 1979). 
 
In August 1982, Mexico announced that it is unable to pay its large foreign debt, 
triggering a debt crisis spreading throughout Latin America. From this time, related 
researches of sovereign debts have flourished, such as rescheduling sovereign debt 
(Garten, 1982) and sovereign debt restructuring (Weinberg, 1985). 
3.1.2 International Research of Government Debts 
From the financial crisis started in 2008, the risks of sovereign debt and government 
bond have attracted much more attention than before.  
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Sovereign (central government) risk mainly embodies in the form of bonds. For 
government debt itself, the researchers are concentrated to macro aspects, especially 
influence of policy and politics: 
 
Firstly, if a company is not totally independent, i.e. partly owned by a government, then 
its credit spread will be negatively correlated with the proportion of government 
ownership (Borisova & Megginson, 2011). 
 
Secondly, political struggle and short sight will bring some trouble, which seems 
obviously: in particular, transparency decreases debt accumulation, while increasing 
political polarization increases debt accumulation (Alt & Lassen, 2006). However, even 
if the government is short sight because of some internal or external causes, the default 
cost of external debt will force it seldom default, but may transfer the risk to domestic 
sectors (Acharya & Rajan, 2013). 
 
Lastly, a state with a weak government or in crisis will lead some negative results. For 
instance, because there is little commitment of government, investment and the stock of 
government debt will be negatively correlated; debt relief cannot affect the long-run 
level of investment, either (Agular, Amador, Gopinath, 2009). A state in crisis is also 
fragile when there are speculators large enough. They could influence its financial 
market, and benefit from the arbitrage opportunities; however, the default probability of 
such states will increase significantly and alarmingly (Carfi & Mosolino, 2012). 
 
Besides the influence of politics and policy, there are also other opinions. For example, 
the sovereign risk channel could exacerbate indeterminacy problems if monetary policy 
is weak (Corsetti et al, 2013); sovereign states could use stochastic programming model 
to issue optimal portfolios of fixed and floating securities (Consiglio & Staino, 2012); 
government debt could choose optimal maturity structure to cater clienteles (Guibaud et 
al, 2013). 
 
There are a lot of papers discussing about government bond spreads and premia, most of 
which are focusing on euro area. This may be because the state of chaos after the 
financial crisis provided variety of independent develop route, with plenty of economic 
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phenomena and evidences. Here, the term "yield spread" or "credit spread" is the 
difference between the quoted rates of return on two different investments. 
 
For the determinants of spreads in Euro area, there is no consensus, and possible factors 
are combined differently: liquidity and risk (Favero et al, 2010); those plus solvency and 
the expected debt-to-GDP ratio (Assmann & Boysen, 2012); mainly differences in 
credit quality, and partly liquidity (Beber et al, 2009); short-term interest rates, 
policy-relevant default risk and liquidity risk (Manganelli et al, 2009); just 
country-specific variables and an international common risk factor, without liquidity 
risk (Oliveira et al, 2012). Broadly speaking, the credit of government is a common 
factor, and liquidity takes advantage. 
 
For the specific dominate and foreign factors, fiscal variables (budget balance, 
government debt, etc.) and global financing conditions (the US interest rate, etc) are 
proposed (Maltritz, 2012). Besides local variables and international factor, a third factor 
is also suggested as expectations of exchange rate devaluation (Furthermore & Favero, 
2013).  
 
Interestingly, there are two opposite opinions on whether the factors change by time or 
remain. Bernoth et al. (2012a) applied a time-varying coefficient model, and identified 
that the main factor altered during the pre-crisis period, from debt level and risk 
aversion to safe haven status to fiscal loosening. However, von Hagen et al. (2011) 
believe that bond yield spreads during the crisis can be considerably explained by the 
same variables as before.  
 
As an application of yield spreads, compared with EMU countries, yield spreads of 
non-EMU ones are influenced more by systemic risk factors. It may show that 
government bonds of EMU countries have a better safe-haven status (Gomez-Puig, 
2009). 
 
In the field of premium, European countries also have been more studied: Risk premia 
of central governments are positively related to debt and deficits, but the local ones 
performance inconsistently (Schuknecht et al, 2009). It is suggested that interest 
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differentials contain risk premia, which increases with fiscal imbalances and decreases 
with relative bond market size of the issuer (Bernoth et al, 2012b). Besides, short-run 
fiscal austerity measures are not able to contain the default risk premium; however, a 
long-term plan for fiscal reform can ease up the rising risk premium, if the market has 
confidence on it (Bi, 2012). Additionally, risk premium could explain a certain degree of 
credit spreads (Flandeau et al, 2012). 
 
An important conclusion is about the limit of solvency of government, which should be 
taken seriously: The government faces an endogenous debt limit beyond which debt 
cannot be rolled over. It is demonstrated by a stochastic model (Ghosh et al, 2013). 
 
After these, another important discovery is that most of sovereign credit risk can be 
related to global factors. Furthermore, it related to the US stock market more than to 
local economic (Flandreau et al, 2012). 
 
There are also lots of papers discussing the sovereign risk and default risk. Here some 
representative ones are commented, which are mainly divided into categories of risk 
management, default risk, general theory and others. 
 
In order to shift and manage risks, asset allocation of defined benefit pension plan is a 
good policy, in which companies with weak financial foundation will receive a greater 
share of pension fund as safer securities (government debt, etc), while firms with strong 
basis can invest more heavily in equity. Thus the pension fund investment policy can 
also be better applied (Rauh, 2009). Besides, by applying fiscal austerity programs, risk, 
in sovereign debt crisis, are hindered from damaging elsewhere (Kalemli et al, 2014). 
 
When sovereign debt defaults, banks and financial institutions (e.g. investors) will 
receive heavy shocks. On the other hand, financial institutions and government should 
support each other in crisis. 
 
First, of course, government defaults will lead to declines in private credit, especially in 
larger countries with developed financial institutions holding government bonds. Also, 
in these countries, the probability of default will be lower. (Gennaioli et al, 2014) 
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Second, banks and governments are connected at certain degree, so bank stock returns 
will be negatively affected by downgrades of sovereign credit rating. The stronger 
support the banks received from government, the more seriously they are affected. So 
investors will perceive interconnected domestic banks and sovereigns (Correa et al, 
2014). 
 
Besides, in risky countries, regulators tend to let banks to hold risky assets, so 
governments can borrow money cheaply since risks are shared; while in safe countries, 
the regulation will be tighter (Uhlig, 2014). 
 
For emerging markets, higher levels of fiscal and political decentralization will increase 
sovereign default risk (Eichler et al, 2013). Private sector of emerging markets, when 
enters international debt markets, will lead sovereign debt crises declined, especially in 
the non-financial sector (Arteta et al, 2008). Besides, in the case of Greece, bond yield 
spreads for different maturities are considered to be integrated (Karmann et al, 2012), 
and in Argentina, default is more likely in recessions (Arellano, 2008). 
 
For different factors and crises, there is still relationship between them. For example, 
not all crises are equal. In fact, they will differ depending on whether the government 
faces insolvency, illiquidity or various macroeconomic risks (Janus et al, 2013). There is 
also sequence for different crises, that is, external debt surges are before banking crises, 
and banking crises often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises; besides, public 
borrowing surges are before external sovereign default (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). 
 
In addition to these papers, there are also scholars focusing on specific countries, such 
as the crisis of Greece, and the potential danger of the US (Bohn, 2011; Featherstone, 
2011), which are not discussed here. 
3.1.3 Local Debts and China's Debts 
Local government debts, also called as municipal securities, are studied for long time. 
By issuing municipal bonds, cities are able to raise funds for the construction or 
purchase of large equipment, and funds can be used to subsidize private activities, for 
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repayment of old debts and settle government pensions and so on. In addition, 
investment in local government bonds should be exempt from local tax on interest 
(Ronald, 2006). 
 
Compared with the central government, local governments have the advantage of 
information on providing public products, so local government bond issuance will help 
improve local government supply pure public goods, and optimize the supply structure 
of public goods (Li & Ju, 2010). In addition, expenditure of local public goods is 
generally capital expenditures, so it is more reasonable for government to raise funds for 
construction rather than tax (Zhang, 2013). 
 
For general theoretical conclusions of the relationship between central and local 
governments, if the amount of local bond is determined by central government, an 
inflation target induces excess issuance of local bonds, which is worse than in the case 
that local government determines the amount of local bond (Fujiki & Uchida, 2011). 
The central government intervention is not required to carry out an efficient local debt 
policy. Besides, a form of partial coordination results is more efficient rather than full 
coordination (Nagami & Ogawa, 2011). 
 
Government sovereign debt risk management oversight and external shocks induced by 
the sovereign debt crisis is the main reason inducing sovereign debt crises (Zhang, 
2010). Additionally, the external debt, with very rigid repayment obligations, of local 
government is likely to become a outbreak of local financial crisis (Yuan, 2004). 
 
There are different situations of the local debts, for various reasons, in different 
countries.  
 
In Indonesia, repayment of local debt has been very poor. This problem is largely a 
function of unwillingness to repay debts and of central government acquiescence (Lewis, 
2003).  
 
For Flemish municipalities (Belgium), there are mainly political reasons. Because of the 
multiparty, the governments are weak and not unified. This leads weak governments, 
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which affect the short-term debt levels (Ashworth et al, 2005). The level of political 
fragmentation of the government also affects both the need for and possibility to engage 
in opportunistic policy cycles (Geys, 2007). 
 
In Norway, those local governments with good fiscal conditions behave more forward 
looking than other local governments. Similar to Flanders, party fragmentation is 
negatively associated with forward-looking behavior (Borge & Tovmo, 2009). 
 
In the United States, revenue diversification has emerged as an important trend in US 
local and state government finance, while municipal debt is a critical source of revenue 
for local governments and is used for construction of roads, schools, and other capital 
costs (Beckett-Camarata, 2009). Revenue stability is a significant factor that rating 
agencies take into account when determining a government's capacity to pay off debt 
(Yan, 2011). 
 
In Spain, local debt per capita is influenced by socioeconomic variables (population, 
percentage of immigrants, income, transfers and taxes), political variables (such as 
political strength) (Dolores, et al, 2011) and the electoral cycle (Bastida, et al, 2013). 
Besides, the interest rate of local debt is affected by municipal financial situation, 
historical interest rate, levels of expenditures, debt per capita and information openness 
(Bastida, et al, 2014). However, this system is not very applicable for China because 
almost all Chinese banks use the determined fixed rate when release loans. 
 
In China, research in this field started very late, mainly from about 1990s. One of the 
earliest literatures of China's government debt was published in 1989, about government 
debt audit (Wang, 1989). Since 2000s, academics expanded research directions more 
widely. 
 
In Chinese academia, scholars believe that the tax reform began in 1994 made the 
financial power centralized and general affairs decentralized, such that local financial 
resources and the financial burden do not match, resulting in local financial difficulties. 
Local governments, under financial pressure, borrow in disguised form, causing 
swelling debts, deficit, difficult to monitor (Shen, 2013). In the short term, local 
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governments issue their own bonds is an effective way to solve the problem of local 
government debt (Wang Zhiyang, 2013). 
 
The great bailout plan responding to the global financial crisis was devastating, now 
China's government debt is larger than many other developing countries, within which 
the contingent liabilities is noticeable (Li and Lin, 2011). However, total public debt to 
GDP ratio remains under 50%, showing the risk is manageable (Fang & Lv, 2012). To 
deal with this problem, more attention should be paid to improving and reforming the 
Chinese fiscal system, especially the fiscal relationship between central and local 
governments. 
 
Under the current system of Chinese intergovernmental relations, local governments are 
precluded from borrowing and offering guarantees for any borrowing activity (Ma, 
2013). However, for political achievements (Ong, 2012) and for corruption (Zhou 
Xueguang, 2012), local governments, especially rural ones, have become deeply 
involved in debt finance. 
 
However, as a roundabout way, governments often borrow money by enterprises 
(financing platforms) (Ong, 2006), and the debt occurs in the form of contingent 
liabilities, so risks are hidden (Ma, 2013). In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
the high level of local debt might aggravate structural imbalances in China's economy 
(Tsui, 2011). 
 
Local governments in China have certain solvency. If coupled with the management 
experience learned abroad and from previous cases, China's local government debt can 
be managed (Chen, 2008). It should be considered timely to release the right of local 
government debt issuance, and establish a standardized local government financing 
system, which will help accelerate local economic development, prevent and mitigate 
economic risks (Wang, 2010). 
 
However, in this process, attention should be paid to the issue of determining the 
appropriate local bond issue size, rationalize the relationship of power between central 
and local governments (Chen, 2004), and establish an effective monitoring mechanism 
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and restraint, to ensure a healthy financial position (Chen, 2008). Currently, the 
conditions for fully liberalizing local government bonds are not fully equipped (Ma, 
2007). 
 
There are also many scholars interested in foreign experiences, especially those of 
America and Japan. For the aspect of local finance management of central government, 
it is worth learning from Japanese system; for the aspect of market management, to 
learn from American system is recommended (Zhang, 2013). Concretely, literatures 
discussed about risk prevention (Huang, 2010), the regulation through legislative and 
administrative methods (Liu, 2010), manage system (Xu, 2010), structure of financial 
resources and local autonomy (Song & Niu, 2013) learned from Japanese system and 
American market, and so on. Additionally, some scholars also study on other countries, 
such as French, Brazilian and Indian experiences (Zhao & Du, 2011), etc. 
 
Some scholars are considering to establish the local bond market outside the 
economically developed regions (Hu, 2006), but there is obviously higher risk because 
of the unstable revenue, so decision makers must be cautious (Li, Cao et al. 2010). 
 
In the aspect of financial risk and regulation, because the data were few, the academia 
was focusing on the theoretical discussion and estimation. When the central government 
decided to audit local debts in 2013, the stock market turned negatively. This shows that 
the market considered the hidden financial risks as bad news (Pi, 2013). Due to the 
uncertainty of macro and micro factors, some local governments are willing but not able 
to repay principal and interest in full, resulting in credit risks (Wang Jiansheng, 2013). 
Though the current risk is controllable, the system risks still should be alerted (Li, 
2012). 
 
Another study is of relative solvency. By principal component analysis, in China's 30 
provinces (except Tibet), governments with best solvency are Tianjin, Jiangsu, Beijing, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Guangdong and Zhejiang (Wu, 2012). Indeed, six of them have 
been allowed to issue their individual local bonds. However, it does not mean the local 
government can issue their debts freely (Bai, 2012). 
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As a summary of this section, it is noticed that most of the studies are about sovereign 
debt and qualitative analyses, or the regulatory and fiscal system establishment. There 
are almost no literatures discussing quantitatively about local government debt. 
3.2 Credit Default Swap 
In order to obtain a quantitative analysis tool, it is helpful to seek clues from the aspect 
of risk-based pricing objects. The most famous one is the credit default swap. 
3.2.1 General Concepts 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial swap agreement. It is similar to a insurance 
contract that the buyer of the CDS pays CDS fee (spread, or called coupon) to the seller 
periodically, and the seller will compensate the buyer when there is any credit event 
(such as default of loan or bond)8. It is similar to general insurance, but it can be traded 
in the market so investors need not to hold the real underlying security or suffer losses 
from the credit event. 
 
The swap of business revenues of obligations, or called "synthetic" in banking 
terminology, took place firstly in 1981. I.B.M and the World Bank exchanged their bond 
earnings and obligations without actually exchanging the bonds. This deal was worth 
210 million dollars over ten years and opened up a new field of finance (John, 2009). 
 
When the profit of thus swap reduced due to competition, the new idea appeared. The J. 
P. Morgan team thought it would be better to swap the risk of default directly instead of 
swapping rates or real assets. They met the real problem in 1989, when Exxon needed a 
line of credit of five billion dollars. Exxon was an old client so J. P. Morgan accepted its 
request; however, this would tie up a lot of reserve cash and be risky. 
 
To deal with this problem, in 1994, Blythe Sally Jess Masters, a member of the J. P. 
Morgan swaps team, invented an idea of selling the risk to the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD beard the risk and, as "insurance 
                                                              
8Due to a file issued by ISDA (2003), "default" is officially defined as six trigger events: bankruptcy, obligation 
acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, repudiation / moratorium, and restructuring. Three of them are 
principal in practice: bankruptcy, failure to pay and restructuring. 
3 Literature Review 
23 
 
fee", received fee from J. P. Morgan, without other actual transfer. This deal was 
eventually named "credit default swap". This is considered to be the founding of the 
CDS. 
 
The CDS developed mainly in inter-bank market in 1990s. In 1999, International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) has standardized the documentation for CDS 
(Ranciere, 2002), and then the market extended much more rapidly. Especially from 
2003, its market size doubled every year until 2007, with a notional value of CDS 
outstanding of $62.2 trillion (ISDA, 2010). Since the crisis in 2008, the amount has 
fallen every year, to $25.1 trillion in Dec. 2012 (ISDA, 2012). The abuse of CDS is 
considered as an important reason of the crisis started in 2008 (Shah, 2008). 
 
Currently, most CDSs are recorded in standard forms drafted by ISDA (Weistroffer, 
2009). In the standard model, which is developed by ISDA and Markit, investors can 
calculate CDS pricing consistently. In realistic trading, the coupon (CDS fee) is usually 
paid quarterly, and the coupon is decided by the notional principal of the underlying 
security and the quote of fixed coupon on the issuance date of the underlying security 
(OSE, 2014). 
3.2.2 CDS and Sovereign Debt Risks 
In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis spurred a market for CDS in emerging market 
sovereign debt (Ranciere, 2002). Currently, the international scholars are mainly 
focusing on general function of CDS, Latin America, Europe, and (very rarely) China.  
 
There are a plenty of researches about CDS pricing, risk, corporate financing, and so on. 
However, different from corporate CDS, the Sovereign CDSs are much fewer and more 
difficult to grasp because there are much more factors may affect them. In this 
subsection, only those articles related with government risks are paid attention. 
 
In sovereign risk market, the high risk aversion tends to perplex the transmission 
mechanism between CDS prices and government bond spreads (Delis & Mylonidis, 
2011). Daily CDS spreads for emerging market sovereigns are more related to global 
and regional risk premia than to country-specific risk factors (Fender et al, 2012), but it 
3 Literature Review 
24 
 
may also driven by liquidity; meanwhile, the government bond spread is less driven by 
liquidity (Badaoui, et al, 2013). 
 
There is an information transmission mechanism between the bond and the CDS 
markets, and the mutual influence could be affected by market distress (Delatte, et al, 
2012). During the crisis, the rise in sovereign yield spreads and CDS spreads can be 
mainly explained by deterioration in fundamentals and fundamentals contagion (Beirne 
& Fratzscher, 2013). Deviations between CDS and bond spreads are related to 
counterparty risk, market illiquidity, funding costs, and other factors (Arce, et al, 2013). 
 
The Eurozone Periphery countries show significant differences from general EU 
countries, especially five countries: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which are 
sometimes abbreviated as PIIGS or GIIPS.  
 
For general EU countries, fiscal space and other macroeconomic factors are important 
determinants of sovereign risk. However, for Eurozone Periphery countries, there is 
significant difference, especially in 2010. Their default risks are priced much higher and 
vary more severely than others (Aizenman, et al, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
Another noticeable phenomenon is joint default; i. e. whether the default risk will 
spread to other countries. Related researches show that the financial linkages are active 
only for troubled periphery euro area economies, while for other cases the real economy 
linkages play a more important role (Gorea & Radev, 2014). Additionally, the debt ratio 
is the most important driver of default contagion (De Bruyckere et al, 2013). 
 
For Latin American countries, the information in sovereign CDS can both lead and lag 
other financial sovereign debt spread determinants (Wang, Yang & Yang, 2013), and 
global factors including US Baa-Aaa default yield, TED spread and US Treasury rate all 
contribute to the changes in sovereign CDS spread, especially after the global crisis 
(Wang & Yao, 2014). 
 
In the case of China, country-specific factors (the real interest rate, etc) have significant 
explanatory power on China's sovereign CDS spreads, especially in earlier years; while 
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global factors (VIX, i.e. the U.S. S&P 500 stock option volatilities, etc) have increasing 
impact from the global crisis (Eyssell, et al, 2013). 
 
In Chinese academia, the research in this field is much weaker. Over half of the 
researches have focused on the European sovereign debt crisis, and are discussing 
policy topics, such as experiences and enlightening. 
 
Removing those helpless literatures, the remains can be classified as following aspects: 
 
On the topic of effect of Sovereign CDS on sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone, 
researches showed that for general Euro-zone countries, sovereign CDS is at leading 
position in the price discovery process, but there is no evidence supporting the 
necessary relation between sovereign CDS and sovereign debt crisis (Ba, et al, 2012). 
However, for Greece, whose CDS price rose crazily, the deterioration of its sovereign 
debt crisis has been considerably influenced by the CDS (Shu, 2013).  
 
From global perspective to consider the sovereign debt crisis, it is found that the 
conduction and spread become more rapidly, and secondary crises can be easily induced 
(Luan, 2012). Moreover, there exist infectious effects among the debt crisis of different 
countries (Ba et al, 2012). 
 
Although the sovereign CDS market and the bond market are closely linked, the 
theoretical equivalence relation between the two markets is not precisely hold, and 
long-term equilibrium relationship does not always hold, either. The sovereign CDS 
market, in many cases, leads the government bond market, but when the bond market 
guides the sovereign CDS market in the process of price discovery, there is more likely 
to form long-run equilibrium relationship between them. And, to some extent, the debt 
crisis expands the price spread between the two markets (Liu, 2012).  
 
Currently, the legal system for financial swaps mainly performs as domestic regulations 
supplemented by limited international cooperation. In the field of domestic regulation, 
the systems of the USA and UK are relatively perfect, but their supervision modes are 
quite different. At the international level, the Basel Committee, IOSCO and the ISDA 
3 Literature Review 
26 
 
have played important roles, but the subprime crisis and Greek sovereign debt crisis, 
still reflected there is regulatory loophole (Qian, 2012). 
 
As a summary of this section, the CDS is directly related with the credit risk of a 
company or a government, so it is often considered as an intuitive measure of the credit. 
Most literatures are discussing on topics of corporate CDS, CDS and financial crisis, 
and regulatory, and there are just a few mentioning sovereign CDS. 
 
However, for the core purpose of this section, the relation between CDS and local 
government risk, unfortunately, there is no literature researching on this field. But there 
are actually methods to calculate CDS data and therefore default probability by 
parameters derived from real data (Damiano & Fabio, 2006; Jue Wang et al, 2012).  
 
The methods of estimating CDS data and risk provide a new hint: is it possible to apply 
the concept, CDS, onto local governments with respect to their bonds and debts? If yes, 
the new concept can be called "local CDS" and used for characterizing local 
governments' risk. 
 
Before entering this area, there is another topic that cannot be ignored: shadow banking. 
3.3 Shadow Banking 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, China's governments have set up a lot of financing 
platforms. These financing platforms borrow money from society, not only by bank 
loans, but also through trust, security market, build-transfer (BT) projects, and other 
channels.  
 
A common feature of them is all the informal financing methods are weak supervised 
and almost not regulated. Hence they are called "shadowed" since they are hard to 
observe and capture. 
 
Shadowed factor is not worrying in the issue of scales of China's local government debt, 
because all the debts are audited by strict rules. However, when analyze the financial 
risk and derive related results, its influence must be considered. Currently, these 
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shadowed factors are collectively called "shadow banking". 
3.3.1 Definition 
The term "shadow banking" is attributed to Paul McCulley of PIMCO, 2007. He firstly 
used this term to describe a large segment of financial intermediation in a PIMCO's 
publication. The origin definition is "the whole alphabet soup of levered up non-bank 
investment conduits, vehicles, and structures" (Paul, 2007). 
 
By 2013, there is still no consensus on the definition, scope and scale of shadow 
banking in academic literatures. In this subsection, several viewpoints are provided: 
 
Paul McCulley (2007) did not mention about the details of shadow banking, such as the 
components. However, he used the data provided by Federal Reserve and pointed out 
that the run of the shadow banking system has turned to decrease after July 2007, with a 
maximum value of about 1180 billion dollars in the United States. 
 
In 2012, Ben S. Bernanke, the chairman of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, raised the fragility of financing system and a definition of shadow banking: 
"Shadow banking comprises a diverse set of institutions and markets that, 
collectively, carry out traditional banking functions - but do so outside, or in ways 
only loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository institutions." 
Shadow banking includes but is not limited to securitization vehicles, asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, money market mutual funds, markets for 
repurchase agreements (repos), investment banks, and mortgage companies (Ben, 2012). 
The data are provided by Fed, but not mentioned in his report. 
 
Using data provided by Fed, Zoltan Pozsar et al computed the scale of American 
shadow banking system for a long time period. They defined the shadow banking 
system as a network in intermediation chain of securitization and secured funding 
techniques, such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), asset-backed securities 
(ABS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and repurchase agreements (repos). They 
measured the size of shadow bank liabilities of a peak of nearly $22 trillion in June 
2007, while the total traditional banking liabilities were around $14 trillion in May 2007 
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(Zoltan, 2010). 
 
Fig. 3.1 Size of Shadow Bank vs. Traditional Bank Liabilities9 
 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has defined shadow banking clearly and showed 
the data. Its definition is "the system of credit intermediation that involves entities 
and activities outside the regular banking system" (FSB, 2011a), which is of a wide 
range. In the monitoring report, the scale of shadow banking was: 
Table 3.1 Size of Non-bank Financial Intermediaries (percentage of GDP)10 
Jurisdiction 2011 2012 Percentage of World
China 20.0 25.8 3 
USA 154.5 165.9 37 
Japan 61.4 64.4 5 
 
Standard & Pool's agrees with the definition provided by FSB, and consider the central 
bank and all depositary institutions (policy banks, commercial banks, credit 
cooperatives and licensed finance companies) as the regular banking system in China. 
They believe only the following credit intermediation activities should be considered as 
shadow banking: the credits are not properly accounted as regular ones, and have 
                                                              
9  Data source: Fed website. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/ 
Traditional Liabilities: the total liabilities of commercial banking. 
Shadow Liabilities: the sum of open market paper, overnight repo, net securities lending, GSE total liabilities, GSE 
total pool securities, total liabilities of ABS issuers, and total shares outstanding of MMMF. 
10 Data source: FSB website, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/shadow_bkg_data/underlying_pdf_data.pdf 
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increased leverage in the real economy or the financial system. From this view, they 
estimated China's shadow banking accounts for RMB 22.9 trillion by 2012, representing 
44% of China's GDP in 2012 (S&P, 2013). 
 
Chinese government also mentioned the range of shadow banking system in a 
non-public file released in Dec. 2013 (State Council, 2013). Chinese government 
divided the shadow banking into three main categories: completely unsupervised credit 
intermediaries, inadequately supervised credit intermediaries, and insufficiently 
supervised or unregulated businesses of institutions holding financial licenses. There are 
no official data of scale of China's shadow banking yet. 
 
3.3.2 Advantages, Disadvantages and Previous Researches 
As once mentioned in Chapter 1, the shadow banking system is created mainly because 
of the excess demand of financing and the insufficient supply capacity of conventional 
banking system, especially in the status of illiquidity.  
 
The shadow banking system can build a bridge for the subprime borrowers and market 
surplus funds, and became the main intermediary. From this aspect, it makes capital 
allocation more efficiently. The dominant position of conventional banking system is 
therefore lowered, so the shadow banking can balance the financial system, too. 
 
However, it widened the entry restriction of financing system, such that more investors 
and financiers with weaker credit entered the market. Moreover, it does not have access 
to the same governmental safety nets that real banks do, nor have to operate under 
meaningful regulatory constraints. 
 
These defects lead regulators and financial market participants cannot clearly perceive 
risks and be hard to response and regulate. Therefore, the uncontrolled shadow banking 
system with too large scale will increase potential risks rapidly, and it may be too late to 
notice crises. 
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In international academia, scholars study on the shadow banking system mainly in the 
fields of influence on existing financial system and countries, government roles, and 
regulatory. 
 
A compelling issue of shadow banking is whether it is stable or not, and whether it will 
affect the existing system. A research pointed out that, the stability of shadow banking 
system depends on the attitude of investors. Under rational expectations, it is stable and 
welfare improving; however, when investors neglect tail risks, it will be vulnerable to 
crises and liquidity dry-ups (Gennaioli et al, 2013). There are short-term and long-term 
relation expansion velocity of shadow banking and financial fragility (Zou et al, 2013), 
and threshold effect exists between the size of the shadow banking system and the 
stability of banking system: When the size of the shadow banking below the threshold, 
the development of shadow banking will help improve the stability of the banking 
system, on the contrary reduce the stability of the banking system (Wang Xiaozhen, 
2013; Mao & Wan, 2012). 
 
Related study shows, the large size of shadowed sector will be associated with higher 
public indebtedness, higher interest rates paid on sovereign debt, a higher level of 
financial instability and a higher probability of sovereign default (Elgin et al, 2013). 
 
The shadow banking system is linked with the fragility of financial system and 
considered as an important factor in the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2008 and 
global recession (Bryan & Rajdeep, 2011). In the 2011 annual meeting, China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) executives indicated that the shadow banks 
government financing platform risk, and real estate credit risk are three major risks the 
banking industry facing in 2012 (Wang Xiaozhen, 2013). 
 
The aspect of regulatory is also a large and important issue. However, the current 
situation is not optimistic for regulators. The scale of shadow banking is increasing, and 
the policy conclusions are hard to apply in short time. 
 
The rise of shadow banking was helped by regulatory and legal changes that gave 
advantages to the following main shadow funding sources: asset-backed commercial 
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paper (ABCP), money-market mutual funds (MMMFs), repurchase agreements (repos), 
and securitization (Adrian & Ashcraft, 2012). Two successful methods have been 
demonstrated for regulating privately created money: strict guidelines on collateral and 
government-guaranteed insurance (Gorton &d Metrick, 2010). 
 
Since 2008, many countries started to pay attention to shadow banking system and tried 
to reform their regulatory. However, the result showed ineffectiveness of measures. It is 
because governments are engaged in competition for financial activity internationally, 
and are affected by financial interest groups. Thus the demand of reforms of stricter 
regulation will turn incremental and symbolic but ineffective (Rixen, 2013). In addition, 
the short-term objects, or short-term horizons, will encourage governments to create 
periods of intense economic activity fueled by credit booms, which will on the contrary 
contribute to the shadow banking system (Acharya, 2012). 
3.3.3 The Framework of Researches in China 
In order to have a comprehensive observation, this dissertation has searched all the 
articles and theses about shadow banking in CNKI website. Until March 2014, there are 
about 800 articles and 80 theses. In them, about 200 articles are published in Chinese 
core journals (hereinafter referred to as "core articles"), which represent relatively high 
academic level.  
 
These 200 articles referred about 900 references (counted with multiplicity). The 
referred articles, not published in Chinese core journals, are called "ring articles" here. 
The author has drawn a simplified map of the networks between these articles. 
 
Simplify Step 1: The following articles should be pruned: 
1) Isolated core articles: with no reference, and not referred by any other core articles. 
2) Single ring articles:  only referred by one core article. 
 
After the first step of simplification, there are 121 core articles and 102 ring articles (63 
Chinese and 39 English) left. However this result is still too complex, so step 2 is 
applied: 
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Simplify Step 2: The following articles should be pruned: 
1) Weak core articles: referred by less than two (0 or 1) other core articles. 
2) Weak ring articles: referred by less than five core articles. 
 
This step is to choose the core of the core, with high academic value. After this step, 
there are 25 core articles and 13 ring articles (2 Chinese and 11 English) left, over half 
of which are referred for over 20 times. The simplified network map is shown in next 
page. 
 
 
In China's academia, the important international literatures, such as IMF reports, Fed 
reports and Paul McCulley's articles, are often referred as theoretical basis. The main 
series of the issue network are as follows: 
 
Series A: Financial Innovation & System Evolution 
Core: Wang Da, 2012 
This series is based on two reports of FSB and one report of Federal Reserve Bank. 
Focusing on the development of American shadow banking system, they pointed out its 
role and potential risks. 
 
Since 1970s, the inconsistency between the objectives of monetary policy and financial 
supervision framework has led more financial innovation than before. The financial 
innovation and the excess demand of institutional investors for safety assets have jointly 
promoted the rapid development of shadow banking in the United States (Wang, 2012). 
This shadow system has democratized credit. The diversified and inexpensive method 
of financing increased productivity, and led to increasing corporate profits and 
accelerating economic growth (Gross, 2007).  
 
However, the abuse of derivatives led a lot of lower quality mortgage securities, 
packaged into complex structured products and traded in markets. Being held in 
leveraged money or capital market vehicles, many securities have substantial liquidity 
risk (Geithner, 2008). Hence it needs much work to regulate such a system. 
 
3 Literature Review 
33 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 Simplified Network Frames of Core Articles 
Remark: Every black arrow indicates citation between two articles, and points to the referrer. Core 1 
is the set of articles referred by others in Core 1 or Core 2; Core 2 is the set of articles referring 
articles from Core 1 and Ring, but not referred by articles shown in this figure. The detailed 
citation (over 50 arrows) of articles in Core 2 is omitted and replaced by white bold arrows. 
For more information about these articles, see Appendix B. 
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Series B: Credit Creation 
Core: Li Bo, 2011 
This is short series, mainly discussing about credit creation of shadow banking and its 
influence. 
 
Credit creation is a basic function of conventional banking system. However, being a 
financing system, the shadow banking also has the function of deposits and loans. Thus, 
its credit creation mechanism contains limited substitution effect to commercial banks, 
and generates external spillovers (the mystery of liquidity) in the currency market (Zhou, 
2011). However, the defect of its mechanism makes the effect unstable, and then 
negatively influences monetary policies and financing market (Li & Wu, 2011). 
 
Series C: Credit Expansion and System Stability 
Core: Yi Xianrong, 2009b; He Dexu, 2009 
The shadow banking system can create credit. However, the oversized shadow banking 
made excessive credit expansion, influencing the subprime crisis to some degree. So the 
system stability is also a victim of shadow banking. IMF releases Global Financial 
Stability Report (GFSR) semi-annually. 
 
"Excessive credit expansion" refers to the expansion of credit money faster than the 
growth rate of real economic output. Shadow banking expands credit unlimitedly in the 
form of securitization to improve the leverage of financial assets, thereby seeking to 
maximize profits for financial institutions. In this process, the agency chain is stretched 
infinitely, but the consequent risk will be suffered by the entire market (Yi, 2009a, 
2009b). 
 
In booms of previous years, low real interest rates, flowed capital and lower real and 
inflation risk make asset prices upward and credit spreads and risk premia narrowed, 
which in turn increase leverage. Long-term risky and relatively illiquid assets are not 
covered by protection, such as deposit insurance. Once the investors withdrew or 
threatened to withdraw their funds from these markets, the system became vulnerable 
(Geithner, 2008). Hence, the excessive financial innovation and incomplete financial 
supervision brought new risks into financial system, which seriously threatened the 
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stability (He, 2009). 
 
Series D: Response and Regulatory 
Core: Wang Qian, 2011; Zhou Liping, 2012 
In 2007-2008, the uncontrolled shadow banking has fueled the crisis and finally led a 
disaster. To learn from past mistakes, it is suggested to collect system-wide data on the 
flow of funds and the flow of risk in advance, thus we are able to put some hard facts 
alongside intelligence (Tucker, 2010). In order to prepare, FSB recommended that based 
on flow of funds tables, countries should analyze the internal relation between banks 
and non-bank intermediaries to accurately observe the size of shadow banking system 
(FSB, 2011b). 
 
For securities regulators and prudential supervisors, it is a key job to ensure that 
leverage and maturity mismatch is transparent. Hence, to design information disclosure 
mechanism will be the focus of future regulation of shadow banking (Ba, 2009a). 
However, it should be noticed that a main reason of the rapid development of shadow 
banking is unbalanced demand and supply in capital market. So, in order to prevent 
risks arising from the shadow banking, a better way is establishing a perfect financial 
market (Wang, 2011). Lastly, notice not to copy the regulatory mode of other countries 
blindly. 
 
By the way, not only in Series D, but almost all of the Chinese articles, in the final part, 
discuss the regulatory and make policy proposals. 
 
As a summary of this section, shadow banking can affect the potential risk in financial 
system, so it must be noticed in related study. However, its research has just started. 
There is even no consensus on the definition and size.  
 
Both in Chinese and international academia, almost all the studies are on the function, 
influence and regulatory of shadow banking, and to estimate the size is almost the only 
quantitative study. It will be alone to work along this direction for quantitative research. 
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4 Local CDS and Structured Model 
This chapter and the next chapter are for the purpose of estimating the default 
probability of China's local governments. In order to capture risks, a useful tool, CDS, is 
adopted. 
 
CDS, as a standardized investment product, is in transaction at every moment now. 
However, it is initially invented as a type of credit guarantee contract, i.e. insurance. 
This shows that CDS contracts also follow the general rule of investment products, such 
as no-arbitrage principle; its price must link with risk directly. This shows the quote 
(price) of CDS is a signal of risk of underlying asset. This chapter will start from this 
point. 
 
In this dissertation, only single-name CDS is considered. The single-name CDS is a 
CDS contract that provides protection against a default event on the part of a single 
issuer ("name"). 
4.1 CDS, Risk and Local CDS 
CDS is a contract on the credit of an underlying asset. So its price (quote) will directly 
be affected by the underlying asset. As mentioned in the previous chapter, CDS is found 
to be quite useful for risk analysis. 
 
In the international market, CDS contracts of both corporate bonds and sovereign bonds 
are in transaction. The quote indicates their risks: CDS premium is determined so that 
net value of contract is zero, i.e. so that no initial fee passed between buyer and seller at 
inception. In the global crisis, the CDS quote of most countries rose highly, showing the 
investors had worried to solvencies of those countries in crisis. 
 
The probability of default, and then credit rating, can also be estimated from the data of 
CDS by models. S&P Capital IQ releases the Global Sovereign Debt Credit Risk Report 
quarterly, in which China's cumulative probability of default is 6.0% in 2010 Q4, with 
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CMA implied rating of AA+ (S&P Capital IQ, 2010, 2013). 
 
The real market has shown that sovereign CDS can reflect the risk of sovereign bonds, 
and corporate CDS can reflect the risk of corporate bonds. It is nature to consider that 
local government CDS would reflect the risk of local government bonds. Hence, in this 
dissertation, the new concept "CDS of local governments", or called "local CDS" for 
short, is proposed. It is defined as the CDS of bonds of a local government, assuming 
the local bonds and CDS are traded in real markets. 
 
A little comparison of strength, flexibility and information openness of these three 
objects is listed as follows. Local government is like a combination of the other two, but 
biased to the government side. 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Government and Company 
 Central Gov. Local Gov. Company 
Strength in  
domestic market 
Strong Weak Weak 
Flexibility Inflexible A little flexible Flexible 
Impact of  
policy change 
Significant Locally influential Almost slight 
Information Semi-public Semi-public Semi-public 
Fiscal Situation Fully safe Attentive 
Due to business 
conditions 
Other  
Affected and controlled by 
central government 
 
 
However, currently, the local debts (mainly bonds) are only traded in domestic markets, 
and there is no such a local CDS market. So it is just at the conceptual level, and the 
data need to be estimated. 
4.2 Model Establishment 
In this section, pricing model of China's local CDS will be derived. Generally, there are 
two main types of models about internal credit risk: structural and intensity-based 
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models. Both of them are initially regarded for corporate risks. 
 
Intensity model is generally applicable. Its starting point is the default probability, and 
thus can be applied on different objects. However, the default probability is actually 
what we want in this dissertation. Therefore, it is more suited to the second step, when 
the CDS data have been derived. 
 
The other one is structured model. It is based on economic parameters, which can be 
estimated from the real market; also, it can calculate default risk by itself. However it 
also has a major defect: it is specialized for corporate risk. 
 
Hence, there are two choices: to look for a third model, or to find the common 
characteristics and modify suitably? It is more feasible for the latter one. In fact, Wang 
Jue et al (2012) have already made helpful attempt by the structured model. 
 
In setting of structured models, default is related with the value of assets of a company. 
When the value of a company breaches a pre-determined level, the default happens. 
Structured models are of a relatively popular class in recent years, and were first 
introduced in 1974 by Merton. In Merton's model, the default happens only at the 
maturity, if the asset value of a firm becomes less than a barrier level then. 
 
Another pioneering structural model, attributed to Fisher Black and John Cox (1976), is 
one of the earliest extensions of Merton model. The default can occur before the 
predetermined maturity. Whenever the asset value of a firm becomes less than a barrier 
level, the default happens. The value is also called the first-passage time. 
 
Both in Merton and Black-Cox model, the total value of a firm’s assets are assumed to 
follow a geometric Brownian process. From a valuation perspective, the market value of 
a corporation is the present value of expected future free cash flows. The biggest 
difference between them is the form of survival probability. 
 
For this reason, in this chapter, both Merton model and Black-Cox model are employed. 
Combine these models into structural model, and derive the expression of CDS quote. 
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In Merton and Black-Cox model, the asset value Vt is assumed as a diffusion stochastic 
process following a geometric Brownian motion: 
d d d ,t t t tV V t V Bμ σ= +       (4.1) 
where Bt is the standard Brownian motion. Its solution is  
2( /2)
0 .t
t B
tV V e
μ σ σ− +=        (4.2) 
 
It means the log-returns of values follow a normal distribution: 
2
2
0
log ~ , .
2
tV N t t
V
σμ σ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
     (4.3) 
 
Assume that the debt level Lt that should be paid every year also follows an exponential 
growth in short term: for simplicity, assume the growth is stable. 
0 .
at
tL L e=        (4.4) 
If a = 0, the debt level will be constant. 
 
Based on Merton and Black-Cox model, the price (quote) of CDS can be considered as 
the price of a call option. The key idea is attributed to Gökgöz et al (2014). 
 
The equity (asset - debt) can be represented as the price of an option written on the asset 
with strike price equal to Lt of a zero coupon bond. At the maturity T (for Merton model) 
or whenever (for Black-Cox model) the value of underlying asset becomes lower than 
the strike price, the option will be exercised.  
 
Here the price of option is not concerned, but the survival probability is the emphasis: 
( | ) ( | ),sur t T tτ τ τ= > >GP P      (4.5) 
where ˆinf{ 0 | }t tt V Lτ = > ≤  is the default time.  
 
Noticing the Vt follows a log-normal distribution, the survival probability and default 
probability under Merton model is 
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2 2( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) 1 ( ),sur T T defT V L d T d= ≥ = Φ = −ΦP P P   (4.6) 
where Φ is the cumulative function of standard normal distribution, and 
2
2,
log( / ) ( / 2)( )( ) t tt
V L r a T td T
T t
σ
σ
+ − − −= −     (4.7) 
is a parameter of Black-Scholes formula. For the proof, see Appendix C. 
 
Due to T. Bielecki et al (2009), the survival probability under Black-Cox model is: 
2
2( ) 1
3 4( | ) ( ) ( ),
r a
t
sur
t
Ls t d d
V
στ τ
− −⎛ ⎞> > = Φ − Φ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
P    (4.8) 
where  
2
3,
log( / ) ( / 2)( )( ) ,t tt
V L r a s td s
s t
σ
σ
+ − − −= −     (4.9) 
2
4,
log( / ) ( / 2)( )( ) .t tt
L V r a s td s
s t
σ
σ
+ − − −= −     (4.10) 
The term a fortunately does not affect the result. 
 
Now, use c to denote price (spread) of a single name CDS, and use N to denote the 
notional amount.  
 
Divide the time to discrete times ti: t0 = 0, t1, …, tn = T. The buyer of CDS contract pays 
the premium to the seller:  
1
(0, ) ( ) ,
n
premium i sur i i
i
PV cN D t t t Acc
=
= Δ +∑ P     (4.11) 
where the second term Acc is accrual payment, and D is the discount factor: 
0
d
(0, ) .
t
tr tD t e
−∫=  
 
For simplification, assume the default can also occur at the middle of two consecutive 
payment dates (Schoutens, 2009). Thus the term Acc can be estimated by 
1
1
1 (0, )[ ( ) ( )] .
2
n
i sur i sur i i
i
Acc cN D t t t t−
=
= − Δ∑ P P    (4.12) 
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When the default occurs, the seller should pay the protection leg to the buyer 
(Schoutens, 2009): 
1
1
(1 ) (0, )[ ( ) ( )].
n
protect ec i sur i sur i
i
PV R N D t t t−
=
= − −∑ P P   (4.13) 
where Rec is the recovery rate. 
 
The non-arbitrage principle orders the two terms equal each other, so  
1
1
1
1 1
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4.3 Model Application and Data Collection 
4.3.1 Model Application 
After the establishment, consider how to apply the model onto local governments. The 
crucial problem is how to describe the assets of a local government? 
 
Wang Jue, et al (2012) have considered this question and divided government's assets to 
two parts: financial assets and non-financial assets. Financial assets include currency 
and deposits and other securities, and the major of non-financial assets is fixed assets.  
 
For Europe countries, the data access is easy: GFS database publishes financial data 
quarterly for all the countries, which includes data of total financial assets, measured by 
ESA 95. However, there is no such a source for China's data, to say nothing of local 
governments. 
 
Another problem is how much of government's asset can be considered as the "total 
asset". For instance, it would be hard to imagine using fixed assets to ease the fiscal 
pressure. In United States, government shutdown has occurred for 7 times (once of 
federal government and 6 times of local governments) since 2005 because of funding 
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gap, but they never pledge fixed-assets for funding. 
 
So the object could be limited as a part of financial assets. Within the financial assets, 
obviously, the revenue is the easiest to capture. Immediate thought is to use the revenue 
as assets. 
 
Actually, this choice is quite rash and reckless. But there are two reasons to support this 
behavior: 
z One is the term log Vt in the model. It shows that if the proportion of revenue to 
asset does not change violently, there will be only a difference of a constant. 
z The other evidence is some local governments have already added repayment of 
local bonds into budget as public expenditure11. So it should be guaranteed by 
revenue, too. 
 
Anyway, it is a bad approach, but currently there is no other better method.  
 
Other key parameters used in Merton and Black-Cox models are adopted as: 
z The pre-determined liability level: the amount of debt that should be repaid in the 
same financial period. It can be got from the audit result. 
z Recovery rate: in ISDA standard model, it is set as 40%. But in this dissertation, 
this term is not cared. The reason will be explained in Chapter 5. 
z Risk-free short-term rate: 1-year treasury yield. 
z Drift and volatility: will be derived from real data. 
 
To estimate data of all the provinces is a large work and hard to get useful information, 
so we are going to estimate one government at provincial level. In this chapter, 
Shanghai (上海) is selected as the object. It has the following characteristics: 
z Good information disclosure 
z Developed market economy 
z Simple hierarchical structure of government 
z Often selected as a representative of China's local government 
                                                              
11 For example, a section of The report on the implementation of the Shanghai's budget in 2013: "... Plus 5 billion 
yuan of repayment of local government bonds ... the total public expenditure is 466.62 billion yuan." 
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In addition, for comparison, CDS data of 5-year bonds will be calculated. 
4.3.2 Data collection 
Now, look for the data. Revenue, debt, yields and derived variables are needed. 
4.3.2.1 Time series 
Because of the limit of valid data, in this chapter, quarter data from 2011 will be 
estimated. Therefore, discrete time series is set as 
2010 Q4: t0 = 0 
2011 Q1: t1 = 0.25 
2011 Q2: t2 = 0.5 
... 
2013 Q3: t11 = 2.75 
2013 Q4: t12 = 3 
2014 Q1: t13 = 3.25 
... 
4.3.2.2 Revenue 
The revenue data can be obtained directly from Shanghai Finance Bureau website. The 
quarter data are: 
Table 4.2 Shanghai's Quarter Revenue (billion yuan) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2010 75.44 80.97 68.2 62.75 
2011 103.45 98.66 78.87 62 
2012 110.37 105.48 85.48 73.04 
2013 119.76 114.82 94.19 82.18 
2014 142.44 
 
It is easy to notice the data contain seasonality. In order to remove the seasonality, it is 
considered to add a seasonal factor St as an exogenous variable: 
ˆ ˆ, or .t t t t t tV S V V S V= + = ⋅       (4.15) 
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Here V-hat means the variable contains seasonal factor, and the period of St is 1 year. 
 
No compare the two models. If the magnitude of the seasonal fluctuations does not vary 
with the level of the series, the additive model is better; otherwise, a multiplicative 
model is more appropriate (RR. Marathe et al, 2005). 
 
A) Differences of revenues to annual revenue / 4: 
Table 4.3 Test of Additive Model (billion yuan) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2010 3.60 9.13 -3.64 -9.09 
2011 17.70 12.91 -6.88 -23.75 
2012 16.78 11.89 -8.11 -20.55 
2013 17.02 12.08 -8.55 -20.56 
 
B) Proportion of every quarter revenue to annual revenue: 
Table 4.4 Test of Multiplicative Model (%) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2010 26.3 28.2 23.7 21.8 
2011 30.2 28.8 23.0 18.1 
2012 29.5 28.2 22.8 19.5 
2013 29.1 27.9 22.9 20.0 
 
Obviously, the magnitude varies with the absolute scale, but substantially keeps general 
proportions. For this reason, the multiplicative model is adopted. 
 
Take logarithm of the revenue data and establish the following linear regression model: 
1 2 2 3 3 4 4
ˆlog ,t tV a b t b D b D b D ε= + + + + +    (4.16) 
with dummy variables: 
i1, if the data is of Q .
0, otherwisei
D ⎧= ⎨⎩      (4.17) 
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Apply generalized least squares regression, the result is: 
2 3 4
*** *** ** *** ***
2
ˆlog 4.6048 0.0955 0.0835 0.3180 0.5064
     ( 190.1 )(10.10 ) (-3.08 )    (-11.77 )  (-20.15 )
0.986; Sig. 0.000
t tV t D D D
t
R
ε= + − − − +
=
= =
 (4.18) 
**: 5% level; ***: 1% level 
 
The seasonal factor of four seasons can be derived directly from this result. But the 
result is just a proportion, so there needs another standard to rescale data: the annual 
revenue before and after adjustment should be consistent. 
 
As a result, the deseasonalized data are: 
Table 4.5 Deseasonalized Quarter Revenue (billion yuan) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Factor 1 0.92 0.73 0.60 
2010 (61.87)  (72.19) (76.87)  84.53  
2011 83.98  87.07  88.00  83.52  
2012 89.60  93.09  95.37  98.39  
2013 97.22  101.33 105.09  110.70  
2014 115.63  
(*) means the data is before time 0 and would not be used in the model 
Derived parameters are: 
V0 = 81.15, volatility σ = 0.0751, drift μ = 0.0983. 
 
In addition, there is another simple method to calculate seasonal factor: take the average 
of every season and derive their proportion. This method will be discussed in Appendix 
D. 
4.3.2.3 Liability 
Now, estimate the parameters of liability: growth rate a and initial quarter amount L0. 
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To estimate the growth rate, it is better to get information from historical data rather 
than future data. In Shanghai's audit result, the debt amount of June 2013 is 506.42 
billion yuan, and of Dec. 2010 is 349.06 billion yuan. Annual growth rate is 16.05%. 
 
Take this rate as average annual growth rate of liability,  
a = ln 1.1605 = 0.1488. 
 
Also, due to the audit result, the amount of debt to repay in July to Dec. 2013 
(short-term debt) is 67.363 billion yuan. i.e. 
L2.75 + L3 = L13Q3 + L13Q4 = 67.363, 
assuming the liability growth stably, 
L0 = 21.952. 
4.3.2.4 Risk-Free Short Term Rate 
1-year treasury yield is a common type of risk-free short-term rate. The run of recent 
years is shown in the following figure: 
 
Fig. 4.1 One-year Treasury Yield12 
For simplicity, the average rate 3.086% (annual) is adopted. 
 
 
                                                              
12 Data source: http://bond.hexun.com 
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4.4 Estimation, Prediction and Discussion 
When accompany the seasonal factor, some expression of previous models would 
change: 
 
The expression of Vt : 
2( /2)
0
ˆ .tt Bt tV S V e
μ σ σ− +=        (4.19) 
Survival probability in Merton model: 
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Survival probability in Black-Cox model: 
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Fortunately, the results are not changed by the seasonal factor. 
4.4.1 Estimation and Prediction 
Use Merton model and Black-Cox model to estimate Shanghai's CDS data from 2011 to 
2014. Because the factor Rec is not cared in this chapter, the result does not contain this 
factor, and thereby called "ortho-CDS". Here the prefix "ortho-" means "straight, free 
from resize". 
 
The result is shown in Table 4.6; a comparison with observed China's CDS is in Fig. 4.2. 
Compared with China's quarter-average CDS:  
z The correlation between Merton's result and China's is 0.38. 
z The correlation between Black-Cox's result and China's is 0.37. 
z The correlation between Merton's and Black-Cox's results (until 2014 Q1) is 0.74. 
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Table 4.6 Ortho-CDS 
Merton Black-Cox  Merton Black-Cox 
2011Q1 90.3  114.1  2013Q1 147.4  202.2  
Q2 111.3  106.0  Q2 171.2  183.2  
Q3 145.5  122.4  Q3 187.3  171.4  
Q4 248.1  223.3  Q4 176.6  141.8  
2012Q1 123.1  164.4  2014Q1 97.1  124.4  
Q2 147.1  151.5  Q2 106.0  204.5  
Q3 173.8  155.3  Q3 124.8  70.0  
Q4 184.8  151.0  Q4 73.8  388.7  
Italics are predicted data. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 Ortho-CDS and Comparison 
Remark: The curve is the real China's CDS in international market (source: Bloomberg). 
Unit is basis point (0.01%). 
 
Because of uncertainty, data of last three periods (2014Q2 - 2014Q4) vary severely. 
Here is a simulation result of Monte-Carlo method for the next seven seasons (repeated 
for 30 times): 
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Fig. 4.3 Overlapped Box Plot (Left: Merton; Right: Black-Cox) 
 
4.4.2 Discussion 
Compare the trend of data above, the following features can be noticed: 
 
1) There is seasonality in the simulated CDS data. It shows in the model, the seasonal 
factor acts a significance role, and the seasonal location of revenue also affects 
investor's confidence. 
 
2) Until 2012 Q2, the trend of Shanghai's and China's CDS is highly consistent 
(correlation = 0.81 for Merton and 0.90 for Black-Cox). There may be great global 
event affecting both of them. 
 
3) In other period, the result is not quite consistent with China's CDS, but the trend of 
two models is roughly consistent. It may be because the local government also has its 
own feature, but an important reason is the model is too simple to reflect enough market 
information.  
 
4) Because of uncertainty, the results from 2014 Q3 vary severely. Merton's volatility is 
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higher. This might be because Merton model only observe the status on the maturity, 
and the unknown information, therefore randomness is higher; while Black-Cox model 
considers real-time status, and contains more information. 
 
As an overall review of this model, the following points are proposed: 
 
This model has firstly attempted to analyze risk of local government quantitatively, and 
has actually found a feasible method to simulate CDS data. As will be shown later, the 
model is identifiable for different fiscal situation. 
 
Also, this model shows a possibility to apply firm specialized models, such as structured 
model, to local governments. Although still imperfect, it has good prospects. 
 
However, it is just a simple model, and also contains defects: 
 
The first one is it contains too little information for a local government. The uncertainty 
only comes from the volatility of revenue, and the latter one contains just vague 
information of real economy. Besides, many other factors that may affect risk are not 
reflected in this model, such as asset structure, debt structure, real-time growth rate, 
shadowed factor, and so on. 
 
The second is to use the revenue as the asset is too rough. What should be considered as 
the "asset value" of a local government in this model could be a separate issue. Also, 
government is not a company, and therefore to use all the assets (or revenue) as the 
capital for the solvency is also strange and unrealistic. It seems better to take just a part 
of assets. 
 
Another problem is the jump between time points is a little long (three months). This is 
because the valid data are insufficiency. Macroeconomic data are often released 
quarterly or even annually, and very few are released monthly. This problem is hard to 
overcome in short time, until the real market is established. 
 
Last is the result cannot be verified by observed real data, because there is no such a 
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market. In physics, such estimation or calculation of unobservable variables can be 
verified though other derived observable variables. This could be a hint, but for local 
CDS, the derived variable (default probability) is also hard to observe in current 
situation.  
 
The improvement and future prospects of this model are: 
 
First, introduce more volatility factors into this model. For example, in current model, 
the uncertainty only comes from the asset value Vt; it would be progress if consider the 
integrated variable Vt / Lt, in which the volatility of liability is concerned together. Of 
course, if there were enough data, their individual volatilities could be captured 
separately. 
 
Second, introduce the asset structure and other information into this model. It is 
necessary to characterize the asset more precisely. A feasible method is to create 
government balance sheets periodically, but it is patent for governments. Another 
method is to study on the estimation of government asset, which is a new field. In 
current model, only the seasonal factor is adopted. Other market information (such as 
shadowed factors) should also be considered when improve it. 
 
Another role of this model is to derive the limit of debt and debt growth. Rapid growth 
of government debt will lead high risk and high CDS. Conversely, to maintain a stable 
development, it is possible to derive a limit of debt growth. This can be used as policy 
suggestion. 
 
The last issue is to look for a method to examine the result. If the result can be verified 
by real data without lost of information, its practicality will be significantly improved. 
This method would be a signal for investors and policy makers. 
 
These can be left as tasks for future research. Improvement of this model will be 
encouraging progress for both theory and practice. 
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4.5 Province Comparison 
As the last section of this chapter, a comparison of CDS of different provinces will be 
introduced to illustrate the effect of different fiscal situation. For simplicity, this section 
adopts Merton model. 
 
Generally speaking, Shanghai is a strong local government in China. Its GDP, financial 
revenue and political status are all in top of China's provinces. To compare the 
difference reflected by fiscal situation, in this section, another province, Shaanxi (陕西), 
is selected as a representative of medium provinces.  
 
Shaanxi is an inland province, belonging to northwestern China. Its capital is Xi'an. 
Shaanxi's economic is at a medium level, GDP rank = 16 of 31 in 2012 (Shanghai = 11); 
its fiscal situation is also medium, revenue rank = 17 of 31 in 2012 (Shanghai = 4). 
 
Generally speaking, Shaanxi's debt situation is worse than Shanghai's: 
z Total amount of debt is about 53% as Shanghai's. 
z The amount of short-term debt (should be repaid within 6 months) is more.  
(SX 88.6 : SH 67.4). 
z Shaanxi's revenue growth rate is lower (SX 7% : SH 10%) 
z Annual debt growth rate (2010-13) is higher (SX 23.4% : SH 16.1%) 
 
The result of Merton model is: 
Table 4.7 Comparison of Shanghai & Shaanxi 
SH SX  SH SX  SH SX 
2011Q1 90.3 376.9 2012Q1 123.1 450.6 2013Q1 147.4 528.6 
Q2 111.3 301.0 Q2 147.1 373.6 Q2 171.2 451.2 
Q3 145.5 469.5 Q3 173.8 545.3 Q3 187.3 624.0 
Q4 248.1 446.7 Q4 184.8 476.5 Q4 176.6 543.2 
 
Because the parameters are not carefully considered (e.g. the unbalance of growth rate 
is obviously unsustainable), it is just an approximate calculation and only valid in short 
and med-term.  
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In fact, in this estimation after 2014, the rapid growth of debt has led economic collapse 
and therefore the CDS soars over 10000 bps. But at least, as a qualitative result, it 
shows there is significant difference between them. 
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5 Applications of Local CDS and Shadow Banking 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to derive the default probability of a local 
government. There are two types of method: structured and intensity model. 
 
In Chapter 4, it is mentioned that the intensity model is suitable for the second step, 
when the CDS data are obtained. So in this chapter, the data will be applied to estimate 
the risk of Shanghai's debt by applying reduced (intensity) models. This theory is 
mainly attributed to Damiano Brigo (2006). 
5.1 Intensity Model 
In intensity models, the default time τ is considered as the first jump of a Poisson 
process. Without jumping (defaulting) before time t, the risk neutral probability of 
defaulting in the next dt instants is  
( [ , d ) | , ) ( )dtt t t t t tτ τ λ∈ + > =Q F      (5.1) 
where the factor λ is strictly positive and generally called intensity. 
 
The integration of λ is cumulated intensity. Due to the property of Poisson process, the 
cumulated intensity of time τ is exponentially distributed: 
0
( ) : ( )ds : ~ exponential distribution
t
sτ λ ξΛ = =∫    (5.2) 
It is independent of all default-free factors. 
 
Thus the survival probability at time t is 
0
( )d*( ) [ ],
t
s s
t e
λτ −∫> =Q E       (5.3) 
where E* is risk-neutral probability. This is the price of a zero coupon bond in an 
interest rate model with short rate replaced by λ. 
 
When price defaultable bonds, both the short rate and the intensity are adopted: 
0
( ( ) ( ))d* *
{ }[ (0, )1 ] [ ],
T
r s s s
tD T e
λ
τ
− +
>
∫=E E     (5.4) 
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denoting a bond paying 1 at final maturity T without any defaulting before T. 
 
In the calculation of CDS in intensity models, it is proved that with market value 
recovery, if the interest rate and the intensity are constant, the bond spread (and hence 
the CDS spread) will be equal to the risk neutral expected loss rate. Thus, if λ is 
constant over time or in a time period (often used in real transactions), it is easy to back 
out the default intensity from the CDS spread (quote): 
(1 ) .
1ec ec
CDSCDS R
R
λ λ= − ⇔ = −      (5.5) 
For detailed proof, see Appendix E. 
 
Notice that the expression of CDS in (4.14) is actually the product of ortho-CDS and the 
factor 1 - Rec. This is why the factor Rec is ignored in Chapter 4. 
 
A corollary is: the intensity λ is actually equal to the ortho-CDS. 
 
Piecewise constant lambda is just a simple approximation. As an extension, it may be 
expanded to function even stochastic. The result must change greatly. 
5.2 Model comparison 
It is natural to derive piecewise (quarterly) constant intensities directly from Table 4.6. 
Here, only the result of Black-Cox model is repeated: 
Table 5.1 Shanghai's Intensity λ of B-C Model (%) 
Season λ Season λ Season λ Season λ 
2011Q1 1.141  2012Q1 1.644  2013Q1 2.022  2014Q1 1.244  
Q2 1.060  Q2 1.515  Q2 1.832  Q2 2.045  
Q3 1.224  Q3 1.553  Q3 1.714  Q3 0.700  
Q4 2.233  Q4 1.510  Q4 1.418  Q4 3.887  
Italics are predicted data. 
Thus the survival probability of Shanghai can be easily fitted. 
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Notice the structured model can also derive survival probability during the model 
establishment: 
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It would be interesting to compare the result of structured model and intensity model, 
and to compare Merton model and Black-Cox model. The comparison is shown in Fig. 
5.1. 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 Comparison of Survival Probability of 4 Models 
In intensity model, the survival probability keeps decreasing (in exponential form); 
while the probability in structured model maintains for a long time and then decreases 
suddenly. The results of intensity model and structured model are quite different in 
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med-term. This is because their forms of survive probability are totally different: 
z Structure model: only Psur 
z Intensity model: e
Δ
+ Δ
∑∑ ∑
P
P P  
 
So it is not strange there is inconsistency.  
 
However, the results of Merton model and Black-Cox model are quite closed; this 
shows there is almost no difference between them. 
5.3 Shadow Banking 
Besides the above analysis, another factor that can affect the risk and thereby should be 
considered is the shadow banking system. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the shadow 
banking system can affect the potential risk, and has become a big and compelling issue 
for both policy makers and scholars. 
 
However, there is quite little previous research. The only quantitative study is about its 
scale, but there is even no consensus. The author has tried to take the first step to this 
field, but has not gone far.  
 
Because of the lack of previous research, the author proposed some points for related 
study with preliminary calculation. The core idea is the shadow banking system will 
affect the risk intensity λ. Still take Shanghai as the representative. 
 
1) Shadow banking will increase the comprehensive return rate. 
A shadowed way frequently used by local governments is BT (build-transfer). BT 
demands high rate of return, which is heavy burden to local governments. 
 
At the end of June 2013, the total debt of Shanghai government was 519.43 billion yuan. 
Within this, there are 370 billion yuan of bank loans, 23 billion of local government 
bonds, and 83 billion of BT financing. 
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Table 5.2 Components of Shanghai's Debt 
 Amount (billion) Proportion 
Loan 370.40 71.3% 
Gov. Bond 23.10 4.4% 
BT 82.57 15.9% 
Sum 476.07 91.6% 
 
The interest rate of general bank loan (5-year rate) is 6.4%, and the yield of bond is 
3.6% on average. However, the return rate of shadow banking factor (BT here) is quite 
high. A study indicates that the consolidated financing cost of BT project is about 30% 
(Weng, 2014). Therefore, the integrated return rate of Shanghai's debt will be about 10%, 
over 1.5 times as the loan rate. Noticing the average growth rate of Shanghai's revenue 
is actually about 10%, it can be said the current return rate is quite high. 
 
2) Shadow banking will increase contingent liability burden. 
The evidence is from the audit result. Because governments should guarantee for its 
financing platforms, they must bear some risk, and therefore burden. For Shanghai, in 
2012, its debt ratio is 76.1%; but if take the contingent liability into account, the 
comprehensive debt ratio is 87.6%. It means the contingent liability will increase about 
15% of debt burden. 
 
3) Shadow banking will affect the revenue resource. 
This is because most of the revenue is actually tax. Shadow banking will affect the 
fiscal situation of firms in real economy, and thus the tax will be also influenced. The 
predicted effect is the volatility would increase when shadow banking works. However 
there is not quantitative evidence yet. 
 
4) Shadow banking will affect the value of mortgage. 
In real practice, governments often use land usage right, i.e. land premium, or projects 
guaranteed by land premium, as the mortgage of debt. Thus the land premium or its 
predicted growth potential will affect the quality of guarantee. If the land premium 
(price) decreases, the default risk will increase -- in fact, it is indeed the reason of the 
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U.S. subprime crisis. The key point of calculation is how much is such mortgage and the 
effect on intensity. 
 
5) Some of government debt is shadowed. 
For example, trust, BT and security financing are generally considered as shadowed 
method. These three parts occupy about 18% of Shanghai's total debt. In the market, 
these channels have their average default risks. For example, within the trust contracts 
mature in 2014, the default rate might soar to 40% (Leslie, 2014). These average risks 
can provide parameters for local governments (but the difference of a government needs 
to be considered). 
 
6) Shadow banking will disturb financial system itself. 
This is a macro issue and will affect the systemic risk. There are already some scholars 
studying on the field of stability of financial system (see Chapter 3). However, it is still 
quite far to apply this effect onto individual risk. 
 
7) Some other issues 
For example, debt securitization, liquidity risk, leverage and deleveraging: all these 
subjects can influence risk and are related with shadowed factors to a certain extent, but 
they are hard to capture currently and not so closed to the core purpose as the previous 
ones. 
 
 
Currently, both China's central and local governments are trying their best to prevent a 
domestic financial crisis, such as to protect investors through administrative methods. 
This makes the market safer, but also makes it hard to observe the real risk.  
 
Because of the lack of materials, there is no clear and definitive research in the field of 
default probability in shadow banking system, and it is also hard to make further 
progress in short term. However, this topic is attractive and there might be non 
mathematical approach. 
 
The above points and approaches are left as future tasks. But because of practical 
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difficulties, we will still work alone recently in this field. With the cleaning up of 
shadow banking in China, the government may allow some default events in future. 
That time will be a turn point. 
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6 Conclusion 
Historical reasons and practical demands have generated China's local government debt 
problem together. Weak local governments are meeting serious problems, and the 
default will impact the market and cause long-term effect. In order to capture the 
situation quantitatively, this dissertation has found a feasible way. 
 
In this dissertation, the following topics are mainly discussed: 
z General matters of local government debts. 
z Significance of CDS, estimation and application. 
z Shadow banking system. 
6.1 Conclusion 
From the aspect of China's local debts, this dissertation have clarified the fundamental 
knowledge and discussed the reason and problem at first. China's financial system and 
the heavy burden on local governments together caused the huge amount of China's 
local government debt. 
 
After an overview of the current situation and comparison with foreign countries, it is 
concluded that the total amount of government debt is optimistic, but the low revenue is 
not a good signal. Additionally, the proportion of local debt is too high and therefore 
caution needed. 
 
Through reviewing related literatures, the importance of this field is highlighted, and it 
is found that this field is a wilderness yet. So the research direction is decided. 
 
By reviewing literatures, CDS is found as a crucial tool to deal with the risk. Imitate 
sovereign CDS and corporate CDS, the new concept "local government CDS" is 
proposed.  
 
In this dissertation, structured model and intensity model are employed for estimation of 
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CDS. To characterize the features of assets, Merton and Black-Cox models are adopted. 
Applied onto Shanghai's real data, its CDS and default probability are simulated by 
different methods. The result shows Merton and Black-Cox models are closed to each 
other, but there is difference between structured and intensity models because of their 
different form. Also, provincial comparison is applied. 
 
Shadow banking is a relatively new concept. There is no consensus about the definition, 
range and amount yet. However, the businesses in shadow banking system is less 
regulated and supervised, so it is hard to observe the potential risks. When the crisis is 
noticed, it might be too late. Its role of financial innovation and credit creation is 
already taken seriously, and its regulatory is considered by most scholars and decision 
makers. 
 
In this dissertation, two main results are achieved: One is the literature tree of shadow 
banking research in Chinese academia. After simplification for two times, the studies 
are mainly divided into four series. With the academic attention on the issue, this large 
project is unprecedented and would be very likely unrepeatable. 
 
The other is trying to analyze the effect of shadow banking. Because of the lack of 
materials, only fundamental study is applied and some future tasks are suggested. 
 
As a summary, this dissertation has explored a feasible way to analyze the risk of local 
government debt quantitatively and advised some approaches for other economical 
factors. 
6.2 Future Development and Suggestion 
This dissertation has established models of local government CDS for Shanghai, and 
estimated the probability actually. However, the models are still simple, and need to 
improve in future. There are two main aspects: accuracy and practicality. 
 
One improvement is to observe more data and introduce more factors to make the 
models more precise. For example, it is helpful to introduce volatility into liability term, 
or to find a more proper method to characterize the asset of local governments. 
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Another improvement is to strengthen its practicality. If the limit of debt and debt 
growth can be derived, or its result can be examined by real data, the practicality will be 
improved considerably. 
 
Lastly, local CDS is a new concept, and it may be a little ahead of our time that even 
sovereign CDS is not yet completely clear and the local CDS market does not exist. 
 
Shadow banking is more promising. Though it is hard to capture currently, there are 
some feasible approaches:  
 
One approach is to analyze the effect of shadowed factors on the current debt of local 
governments. The composition and amount are observed, so it is much easier. To 
calculate their risk is helpful for the whole situation analysis. 
 
Another approach is to analyze the influence of shadow banking system on the related 
market factors, such as average industry influence (affect revenue) or predicted growth 
potential of mortgage (affect risk). This is more difficult than the previous one, but still 
operable. 
 
For China's policy makers, there are several suggestions for the chaos: 
 
Firstly, to ease the financial strain by high return channels is drinking poison to quench 
thirst. However, it is not an easy decision for current governments because of unrealistic 
hyper growth. For this reason, it is necessary to adjust the budget constraint mechanism 
for local governments and state-owned enterprises based on the actual situation, and 
establish risk-based pricing mechanism. 
 
Secondly, strengthen the regulatory of financial behaviors. Weak regulatory and unclear 
legal responsibility is a big problem of China's shadow banking, which will worsen the 
conduction of risk. 
 
Thirdly, artificially preventing default is not the correct approach. It will only delay the 
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occurrence of the problem, make the problem worse, and even result in market 
distortions. Hence, default should be allowed, but transparent legal system should be 
established before that. In addition, occurrence of default that may lead to chain of 
systemic risk should be prevented, such as banks, state-owned enterprises and local 
governments. 
 
Lastly, when local governments are unable to repay, central government can consider 
lending emergent rescue loans to avoid the spread of crisis. However, such emergent 
rescue loans should be accompanied with high consideration (cost) to warn local 
governments of reckless behaviors. 
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Appendix A List of Governments Allowed 
to Issue Individual Bonds 
In section 2.1, it is mentioned that China's local government bonds have started since 
2009. From 2011, some provinces and cities are allowed issuing their own bonds, with 
restriction on the amount, maturity and other details. Here is the list and map of those 
governments. In the map, deep color is the governments permitted by 2013, and light 
color is the new entrants: 
Table A.1 List of Governments Approved to Issue Individual Bonds13 
Year Provinces Cities Total 
2011 Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai Shenzhen 4 
2012 (None) (None) 4 
2013 Jiangsu, Shandong (None) 6 
2014 Beijing, Jiangxi, Ningxia Qingdao 10 
 
 
Fig. A.1 Map of Listed Provinces and Cities14 
                                                              
13 Source: MOF website 
14 Source: http://www.allchinainvo.com 
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Appendix B List of Articles in Network Figure 3.2, Section 3.3.3 
In chapter 3, the Chinese literature system of shadow banking was analyzed and a network map was drawn; however, because the space is too 
narrow, most of the literatures are abbreviated in Fig. 3.2. Here is the full list of those literatures. 
 
Table B.1 List of Literatures in Fig. 3.2 
Code Author Title Type Source Year 
Ba, 09a Ba Shusong Strengthen the Supervision on the Shadow Banking System J China Finance 2009(7) 
Ba, 09b Ba Shusong Trend and Outlook of Global Financial Regulation under Financial Crisis J Southwest Finance 2009(10) 
FSB, 11a FSB Shadow Banking:Scoping the Issues R/OL FSB website 2011 
FSB, 11b FSB Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation R/OL FSB website 2011 
Gary, 10 
Gary Gorton; 
Andrew Metrick. 
Regulating the Shadow Banking System J 
Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 
2010, F(2) 
Ge, 10 Ge Shuang Mechanism and Risk Prevention of Shadow Banking in Financial Crisis J Journal of Finance and Economics 2010(7) 
Geither, 08 Geithner, Timothy F. Reducing systemic risk in a dynamic financial system R/OL FRB website 2008 
GFSR IMF Global Financial stability Report R/OL IMF website 2008 
Gong, 11 
Gong Minghua; Zhang 
Xiaopu; Wen Zhu 
Risks and Regulatory of Shadow Banking J Cnina Finance 2011(2) 
Gross, 07 Gross Bill Beware Our Shadow Banking System J Fortune 2007(11) 
He, 09 
He Dexu; 
Zheng Liansheng 
Shadow Banking System and Financial System Stability J Economic Management Journal 2009(11) 
He, 13 He Wuxing Boot Chinese shadow banking play "positive energy" J South China Finance 2013(1) 
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Krugman8 Paul Krugman Partying Like It's 1929 N The New York Times 2008.3.21 
LiB, 11 Li Bo; Wu Ge 
The Credit Creation Function of Shadow Banking System and Its Challenge to 
Monetary Policy 
J Journal of Financial Research 2011(12) 
LiJJ, 11 
Li Jianjun; 
Tian Guangning 
Analysis on Top-level Design Issues of Regulatory Reform of Shadow Banking 
System 
J Macroeconomics 2011(8) 
Liu, 10 Liu Wenwen; Gao Ping 
Implications of Collapse of the Shadow Banking System for the Development of 
China's Trust Industry 
J Shanghai Finance 2010(7) 
Liu, 12 
Liu Lanbiao; 
Gong Yuexin 
A Review of the Shadow Banking Issues J Economic Perspectives 2012(2) 
LiY, 11 Li Yang Development of The Shadow Banking System and Financial Innovation J China Finance 2011(6) 
Luo, 12 Luo Zhenxin; Feng Ke Shadow Banking and the Monetary Policy Transmission J Wuhan Finance 2012(4) 
Mao, 12 
Mao Zesheng; 
Wan Yalan 
The Study on the threshold effect of Chinese Shadow Banking on Stability of the 
Banking System 
J Studies of International Finance 2012(11) 
MCulley7 Paul McCulley Teton Reflections R/OL PIMCO website 2007 
MCulley9 Paul McCulley The shadow banking system and Hyman Minsky's economic journey R/OL PIMCO website 2009 
Pozsar, 10 
Pozsar Z; Adrian T; 
Ashcraft A; Boesky H. 
Shadow Banking. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 458 R FRB website 2010 
Tang, 09 
Tang Zhenyu; Liu Bo; 
Lin Shu; Li Xiang 
Looking Defects of Credit Creation in Financial Innovation Process from the U.S. 
Subprime Crisis 
J China Opening Herald 2009(4) 
Tucker, 10 Paul Tucker Shadow Banking, Financing Markets and Financial Stability C 
Bernie Gerald Cantor (BGC) 
Partners Seminar 
2010 
Wang, 11 Wang Qian The Study on Regulatory of Shadow Banking System in the Post-crisis Era J Commercial Times 2011(12) 
Wang, 12 Wang Da 
On the Development, Operation, Influence and Regulatory of American Shadow 
Banking System 
J Studies of International Finance 2012(1) 
Yi, 09a Yi Xianrong The Financial Analysis of Shadow Banking Credit Crisis J Jianghai Academic Journal 2009(3) 
Yi, 09b Yi Xianrong The Financial Analysis of Excessive Credit Expansion in the U.S. Subprime Mortgage J Studies of International Finance 2009(12) 
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Crisis 
Yi, 10 
Yi Xianrong; 
Wang Guogang 
Financial Analysis of Mobility Conduction Mechanism of the U.S. Subprime Crisis J Journal of Financial Research 2010(5) 
Yuan, 11 Yuan Zengting Nature and Regulation of Domestic and Foreign Shadow Banking System J China Finance 2011(1) 
ZhangJ, 12 Zhang Jia; Xu Huawei Risk and Regulatory Measures of Shadow Banking J Economic Review 2012(10) 
ZhangK, 12 Zhang Kun Shadow Banking: Opportunities and Challenges for Commercial Banks J Journal of Finance and Economics 2012(4) 
ZhangT, 12 Zhang Tian 
Vulnerability, Regulatory Reform of the Shadow Banking System and the 
Enlightenment to China 
J South China Finance 2012(1) 
Zhong, 11 Zhong Wei; Xie Ting Risk and Regulatory Reforms of Shadow Banking System J China Finance 2011(6) 
ZhouLP, 11 Zhou Liping Credit Creation of the Shadow Banking System: Mechanism, Effects and Coping Ideas J Chinese Review of Financial Studies 2011(4) 
ZhouLP, 12 Zhou Liping 
On the Progress, Shortage and Outlet of International Regulatory of the Shadow 
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Appendix C Survival Probability 
In Chapter 4, CDS is considered as a kind of option, and therefore the survival 
probability contains a parameter of Black-Scholes formula. Here is the derivation of 
(4.6) and (4.20). 
 
In the amended model, the asset value contains a seasonal factor, and liability bound 
grows stably: 
2( /2)
0 0
ˆ , .tt w att t tV SeV e L L e
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we know the survival probability 
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The proof for (4.8) of Black-Cox model is attributed to T. Bielecki et al (2009). 
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Appendix D Simple Method of Deseasonalization 
In Chapter 4, seasonal factors were estimated by using dummy variables. However, 
there is another simple method to estimate them, and therefore deseasonalize rapidly, 
though there are some restrictions. 
 
Assume that seasonal data satisfy the following conditions: 
1) All the data follow the same structure of form. That is, the model and all the 
parameters remain unchanged. 
 
In this dissertation, the form is  
0
ˆ ,trt Bt tV S V e
σ+=        (D.1) 
where r denotes the drift, and Bt is the standard Brownian motion. 
 
2) The data are consecutive, and the numbers of data for four seasons are the same. 
That means the data are of consecutive n years (but not needed to start from Q1). 
 
Denote the data as: 
31 2 4
5 6 7 8
4 3 4 2
32 4
1 1 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 4 4 0
5 6 7 8
5 1 0 6 2 0 7 3 0 8 4 0
(4 3) (4 2) (4
4 3 1 0 4 2 2 0 4 1 3 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,n n
r Br B r B r B
r B r B r B r B
n r B n r B n
n n n
V S V e V S V e V S V e V S V e
V S V e V S V e V S V e V S V e
V S V e V S V e V S V e
σσ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ− −
++ + +
+ + + +
− + − +
− − −
= = = =
= = = =
= = =
" " " "
4 1 41) 4
4 4 0
ˆ, .n nr B nr BnV S V e
σ σ−− + +=
 
Then, there are two propositions: 
 
Proposition 1 The annual growth rate can be estimated directly from annual data (the 
sum of every 4 seasonal data), and it is unbiased. 
 
This is simple and obvious. 
 
Proposition 2 The proportion of (arithmetic or geometric) means of four seasons is an 
unbiased estimation of the proportion of four seasonal factors, adhered with a growth 
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rate factor. 
Proof. 
A) Arithmetic mean: 
The arithmetic means of four seasons are: 
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3 7 3 4 1 3
8 44
4 ( ) 4( 1) ( )
1 1 0
4 ( ) 4( 1) ( )2
2 2 0
3 4 ( ) 4( 1) ( )
3 3 0
4 ( )4
4 4 0
1 (1 ),
1 (1 ),
1 (1 ),
1 (1
n
n
n
r B B n r B Br B
r B B n r B Br B
r B r B B n r B B
r B Br B
Q S V e e e
n
Q S V e e e
n
Q S V e e e
n
Q S V e e
n
σ σσ
σ σσ
σ σ σ
σσ
−
−
−
+ − − + −+
+ − − + −+
+ + − − + −
+ −+
= + + +
= + + +
= + + +
= + +
"
"
"
" 4 44( 1) ( ) ).nn r B Be σ− + −+
   (D.2) 
 
Notice the distributions of B4k-3 - B1, B4k-2 - B2, B4k-1 - B3, and B4k - B4 (for all nature 
number k) are the same N(0, 4k - 4), their proportion is  
31 2 42 3
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4: : : : : : .
r BB r B r BQ Q Q Q S e S e S e S eσσ σ σ++ +=     (D.3) 
 
Combined with the estimated growth rate, the seasonal factors can be derived. 
 
B) Geometric mean: 
The geometric means of four seasons have a similar form as the arithmetic mean. So 
the seasonal factors can be derived simply, too. □ 
 
 
This method is quite simple, but contains some obvious defects: the condition is quite 
strict, and there will be no information of data significance. So this is just an auxiliary 
method. 
 
The result comparison of this simple method and dummy variables is in the following 
table. 
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Table D.1 Result Comparison of Deseasonalizing Methods 
 Simple Dummy 
V0 80.82 81.15 
μ 0.0975 0.0983 
σ 0.0946 0.0751 
S1 : S2 : S3 : S4 
1 : 0.94 : 0.74 : 0.60 (Ari) 
1 : 0.93 : 0.74 : 0.60 (Geo) 
1 : 0.92 : 0.73 : 0.60 
 
 
Fig. D.1 Result Comparison of Deseasonalizing Methods 
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Appendix E Derivation of Intensity 
In this appendix, we will derive (5.5), the expression c = λ(1 - Rec). The proof is 
attributed to Damiano Brigo (2006). 
 
In standard intensity model, the default time τ is set as the first jump of a Poisson 
process. That is, having not defaulted before time t, the probability of defaulting in the 
next dt instants is  
( [ , d ) | , ) ( )d ,tt t t t t tτ τ λ∈ + > =FQ      (E.1) 
where the factor λ is assumed to be strictly positive and is called intensity. 
 
Define the cumulated intensity: 
0
( ) : ( )d ,
t
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Due to the property of Poisson processes, for the jump time τ (according to its own 
cumulated intensity), 
( ) : ~ Exponential(1),τ ξΛ =      (E.3) 
independent of all the other variables. 
 
However, for an exponentially distributed variable, 
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and in the case of a stochastic intensity, 
0
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It is the survival probability at time t. When computing the price of a zero coupon 
bond, it will be combined with a discount factor: 
0
( ) ( )d
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t
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tD T e
λ
τ
− +
>
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The general intensity model of CDS can denote relatively precise expression of CDS; 
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however, it is used less frequently in practice because of its complexity. The market 
use another simplified form of the intensity model, in which the intensity λ is set as 
constant and, as a result, the model need not interest curve any more. 
 
For simplicity, assume the discount factor is independent of default time τ, and the 
contract fee is paid continuously. 
 
Denote the price of CDS by c and notional amount of the underlying asset by N, then 
the present value of the contract fee, paid by the buyer, in the next dt instants after 
time t is 
{ }[ (0, )1 ]d .tcN D T tτ >⋅E       (E.7) 
 
So the total present value of the contract fee (until default) is 
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where P(0, T) is the discounted price of a bond with the face value of 1. 
 
On the other hand, when the default happens, the seller must pay protection to the 
buyer, which is equal to the lost value (total value minus recovered part): 
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But the default is Poisson distributed, and λ is constant here. So 
( ) ,d ( ) d .t tt e t e tλ λτ τ λ− −> = > = −Q Q     (E.10) 
 
Thus,  
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0
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The non-arbitrage principle orders these two legs be equal, so 
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